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Property and Innovation in the Global
Information Infrastructure
Henry H. Perritt,Jr.t

At least since Blackstone and John Locke, legal and political
commentators have recognized the central role that property
plays in market economies and democracies. Property preserves
personal autonomy and provides an incentive to produce.1 At the
same time, public uses of resources also are necessary to wellfunctioning modern societies. Intellectual-property law creates
property interests in commodities that derive their value from
the information contained therein, rather than from tangible raw
materials. But when information is subject to property interests,
a variety of competing interests enter into the balance between
private ownership and public use.
New information technologies disrupt historic balances
between these competing interests. Just as print technology gave
rise to copyright concepts, just as phonograph recording and film
technology required adaptation of copyright concepts developed
for printers,2 just as the Xerox machine necessitated reassessment of mid-twentieth-century copyright concepts,3 so also does
the Internet require rethinking the role and form of intellectual
property in stimulating a healthy information infrastructure, in
which adequate incentives exist to create and deliver quality
information.

t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I thank Paul Boltz and Eric
Bootsma for research assistance. Some of the concepts in this article are developed more
fully in Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Law and the InformationSuperhighway (John Wiley & Sons,
1995).
See John Locke, Of Civil Government, Two Treatises: Concerningthe True Original
Extent and End of Civil Government 132 (J.M. Dent & Sons, 1924) ("As much land as a
man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common."); William Blackstone, 2
Commentaries on the Laws of England 4 (Callaghan & Co., 2d ed 1879) (stating that
private ownership of property was essential to human development).
2 See Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 430-31 nn 11-12 (1984)
(noting impact of technology changes on copyright law).
' See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 47 (National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works, 1978).
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Threats to established balances do not, however, suggest that
balance is no longer necessary. Owners of intellectual property
should not be granted enlarged economic protection merely
because they would like it. Users and exploiters of existing
intellectual property should not be free of traditional intellectualproperty restrictions just because they would like to be. Rather,
intelligent appraisal of the role of property in an Internet-shaped
information infrastructure should focus on the specific free riding
and piracy risks created by the new technology. For example,
traditional electronic-information services like CompuServe and
Lexis do not present the same problems as the Internet's World
Wide Web ("Web"). Traditional electronic-information services
involve closed systems, within which it is relatively easy to
arrange licenses between creators of content and electronic
publishers. Such systems can enforce copyright by excluding
potential or actual infringers. Neither traditional licensing nor
infringer exclusion, however, is easy in the open-network environment of the Web. Moreover, the publisher/intermediaries in
the Web usually only point to content; they do not reproduce,
distribute, perform, or display the content themselves.4
Unless one carefully probes the implications of specific
technologies and network architectures, one may be drawn into a
fundamental and unnecessary alteration, of the historic balance
between property ownership and socially productive uses of
information resources. The White Paper issued by the Clinton
Administration in 1995' falls into this trap. This Article suggests
how such a trap can be avoided.
One must do more than merely appreciate the technology.
One must also understand the role that the law plays in conjunction with other forms of protection for intellectual property.
Intellectual-property production flourishes in many environments
where legal protection is uncertain or entirely absent, such as the
early days of desktop computer software development and radio

' Copyright law only reserves to the copyright owner the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, perform the work publicly, and to
display the work publicly. 17 USC § 106 (1994).
United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (Sept 1995) ("White Paper"). The White Paper
emphasizes the economic interests of originators and owners of existing intellectual
property while deemphasizing the interests of intermediaries of those creators of new
information value who may have a legitimate need to make use of'existing information
under the fair-use doctrine or otherwise. For a discussion of fair use, see White Paper
§ I.A.7 at 66.
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and television broadcasting. Once one understands the specific
threats posed by specific technologies, and the complex of
protections available from law and other means, one may suggest
legal changes, if any are needed.
This Article begins by exploring the nature of intellectual
property in order to understand the difficult balance between
competing private and public interests. It then explains how the
Internet and other open network architectures bring new challenges to the positions of both content originators and intermediaries. Next, the Article considers a number of solutions for protecting the legitimate interests of intellectual-property owners
while avoiding inappropriate threats and costs for entities that
facilitate legitimate use and exploitation of information in an
open information infrastructure.
This Article concludes that a combination of existing intellectual property and contract protections can sufficiently prevent
gross piracy, especially when reinforced by anticipated changes in
pricing and new product concepts and packaging. In addition, if
Congress makes statutory changes, some new statutory protection for intermediaries may be appropriate. The Article emphasizes that copyright collectives can play a useful role in reducing
transaction costs for the deployment of new types of protection
based on technological limitations on unauthorized uses, technological detection of copyright and license violations, and electronic payment systems. In addition, collectives can make it feasible
to express and enforce specific-use licenses.
The Article does not explore the important question of patent
protection for processes in the Global Information Infrastructure
("GII"). It only mentions in passing the role that trademark and
unfair-competition law can play in protecting the good will and
marketing investment of those that produce information value.
The Article assumes that basic governmental information, such
as statutes, judicial opinions, agency rules and orders, and land
records, is ineligible for intellectual-property protection. 6
Professor Trotter Hardy's article in this volume applies the
Calabresi and Melamed 7 transaction-cost framework to property

6

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, 4 Wm &

Mary Bill of Rights J 179, 197 (1995); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Should Local Governments
Sell Local Spatial Databases Through State Monopolies?, 35 Jurimet J 449, 459 (1995);
Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-Like Controls Over
Government Information, 45 Syracuse L Rev 999 (1995).
' Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972).
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in cyberspace.' Professor Hardy concludes that lower transaction
costs resulting from cyberspace technology justify a shift toward
property instead of liability concepts for protecting originators of
information value.9 This Article, however, concerns a different
facet of transaction costs in markets for information: the transaction costs that justify legal intervention in the first place.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A LIMITED PROPERTY RIGHT
Property enjoys a special place in the ideology and law of
market economies and democratic political systems. Indeed, the
concept of property rights dates back to the earliest Western
thinkers. For example, Aristotle expressly linked man's normative duty to pursue the "happy life" with man's ability to possess
enough property to "make... life desirable and lacking in nothing."" John Locke argued that ownership derives from nature
itself, so that one must work on property in order to divorce it
from raw nature." Because man's relationship with nature, not
with other men, imbues ownership, no one person or group of
persons possesses the power to interfere with that right of ownership.12
A. Moral Rights in Property
Professor Margaret Radin's theory of property and
personhood argues that a fundamental purpose of property is to
give property owners a sense of identity, a feature so critical to
an individual that rights in property must be protected by some
legal framework. 3 The paradigm of this connection between
property and personhood is an heirloom or a house." Yet despite this intrinsic value that property presents to individuals,

8 See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U Chi Legal F

217, 236.
Id at 260.
10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 43 (Harvard University Press, 1947).
'

John Locke, Of Civil Government, Two Treatises 132 (J.M. Dent & Sons, 1924)

(cited in note 1) ("As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use
the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from
the common.").
12 Locke stated that "being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another
in his life, health, liberty or possessions." Id at 119 (emphasis added).
" Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan L Rev 957, 960 (1982)
(stating that personhood springs from the act of becoming "bound up with an external
'thing'").
1

Id at 959.
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the possibility that some property can be easily exchanged for an
identical good negates the inference that all property confers a
moral or natural right." To accommodate the needs of individuals to maintain their sense of personhood through strong property rights and the need of society to allow the free flow of fungible
goods, Professor Radin suggests that property should be thought
of as a continuum. 6 On this continuum, property for personhood
would receive the most protective rights, and correspondingly,
fungible property would receive lesser or no rights.17 Where a
particular piece of
property rests on this continuum depends on
18
social consensus.
Professor Radin's theory accommodates Europe's and
America's traditional legal approaches to intellectual property.'9 Europeans have long recognized the existence of a moral
right to intellectual property which resembles Radin's property
for personhood. °
The American tradition is utilitarian,2 concentrating on the
market for information and seeking to maximize the amount of
content available to society. Under this concept, the fear is that,
if authors have no property rights in their works, the incentive to
create such works will be destroyed and the overall amount of
information available to society will necessarily diminish. But, if
authors have such strong property rights that almost no
unconsented-to use is ever legal, then the information will be so

"2 Id at 960. Fungible goods include cash, wedding rings in a jeweler's case, and
commercial property.
16 Id at 986.
17 Radin, 34 Stan L Rev at 986 (cited in note 13). Radin described this phenomena as
a "hierarchy of entitlements."
" For example, Radin's attribution of personhood to an apartment is justified by the
general feeling that "in today's society a tenant makes an apartment her home in the
sense of a sanctuary." Id at 995. See also Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism:
a Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 Stan L Rev 347, 362 (1993)
(arguing that social consensus is the basis of Radin's continuum and that this basis
provides few objective standards).
1" See William Belanger, U.S. Compliance With the Berne Convention, 3 Geo Mason
Independent L Rev 373, 375 (1995) (describing differences between civil-law moral-rights
approach and common-law utilitarian approach to copyright).
2" Moral rights were expressly recognized in the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 6 bis.
2
Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism, in Tom Regan and Donald Van De Veer, eds, And
Justice for All 217-240 (Rowman and Littlefield, 1982). Utilitarianism is defined by Dan
Brock as "the moral theory that actions are morally right just in case they produce at
least as good consequences as any alternative action open to a person." Id at 218. Thus,
"the utilitarian principle requires ... that the agent ... act so as to maximize expected
utility." Id at 220.
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inaccessible that it might as well not exist. The proper equilibrium is achieved, not by examining the author's sense of identity,
but by designing legal rules to create the largest, most accessible
pool of information.2 2 This utilitarian standard avoids the social
consensus and personal/fungible ambiguities of Radin's theory
by providing a quantifiable method for balancing the competing
public and private property interests.
B. Coase Theorem
Utilitarian analysis argues that intellectual property may be
entirely unnecessary. Thus, it relieves the law of the need to
strike any balance. The Coase theorem argues that, in the absence of transaction costs, it does not matter where law places
entitlements. Parties will bargain and allocate legal rights and
duties according to their economic preferences. If there were
no transaction costs, intellectual property would not matter.
While the originator of valuable information would not have a
copyright, he nevertheless would produce the information because someone who wanted to consume the information product
would pay him to create it.
Transaction costs exist, however, in the real world of information-product creation, distribution, and consumption.24 One
22 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 244 (Harvard University Press, 1981)

(The "purpose of a property right ... is to create an incentive to invest in the creation of
information.").
23 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 10 (1960). See also Guido
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J L
& Econ 67 (1968); G. Warren Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote, 11 J
L & Econ 503 (1968).
24 Calabresi and Melamed argue that the condition of no transaction costs
[M]ust be understood extremely broadly as involving both perfect knowledge in
the absence of any impediments or costs of negotiating. Negotiation costs include, for example, the cost of excluding would-be-free loaders from the fruits of
market bargains ....
[The free loader] is the person who refuses to pay for a
common part, although he wants it, because he believes that others will put in
enough money to make the part available to him ....
[T]he costs of excluding
the free loader from the benefits for which he refused to pay may well be considerable .. including the inefficiency of pricing a good, like the part once it exists, above its marginal cost in order to force the free loader to disclose his true
desire to use it-thus enabling us to charge him part of the cost of establishing
it initially.
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1094-1095 n 13 (1972) (cited in
note 7). Professor Coase himself identifies the following as possible elements of transaction cost: discovering those with whom one wishes to deal, informing people that one
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type of transaction cost arises from the public-goods character of
information. Public goods are those demonstrating the characteristics of nonrivalness or nonexhaustiveness, and
nonexcludability.25 One person's consumption of a public good
neither interferes with nor excludes another person's consumption of the same good. 26 Hence, a public good is nonrival. It is
also impossible (for a pure public good) to exclude any one person
from benefiting from that good.2 ' The classic example of a public
good is a lighthouse. 28 The use by one §hip of its benefit, its
light, does not reduce the amount available for other ships. Nor
can any ships be excluded from the benefits of the lighthouse if
any ship has access to the light. Any ship in the lighthouse's
vicinity may use its light to keep from running aground.29
A private good is both rival and exclusive. ° Consumption of
the good excludes others from consuming the same good,"' and
relative to a public good, it is much easier to exclude consumers
from the good's benefit.3 2 Most of the goods and services bought
and sold are private goods.3" Gasoline, for example, is a private

wishes to deal and on what terms, conducting negotiations leading up to a bargain, drawing up the contract, and undertaking the inspection needed to make sure contract terms
are being observed. Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15 (cited in note 23).
25 See Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J L & Econ
147, 148 (1975) (stating that two crucial properties distinguish goods: nonexhaustiveness
and nonexcludability. "Purely non-exhaustive consumption may be regarded as the ultimate in positive eternality."). Brubaker states that "feasibility of exclusion from consumption... ranges along a continuum, namely, from low marginal cost to high marginal
cost.. . [thus] classification of any specific good can be made according to its position
along the two continua." Id at 148-149. See also Australia Office of Regulation Review and
Economic Analysis of Copyright Reform 13 & n 21 ISBNO-642-233359-4,
orr@mail.indcom.gov.au (Australian Office of Regulation Review and Economic Analysis of
Copyright Reform, 1995) ("[R]ights attaching to real property are the result of scarcity,
while the rights attaching to the expression of ideas create scarcity.").
26 Brubaker, 18 J L & Econ at 148-49 (cited in note 25).
27 Id.
28 Other examples include clean air and the protection provided by the American

military. These goods are both nonrival and do not exclude any consumer from their
benefit. Most public goods are either gifts of nature or provided by the government.
Werner Sichel and Peter Eckstein, Basic Economic Concepts-Macroeconomics 259 (Rand
McNally, 2d ed 1977).
2 There are, however, few pure public goods. Id. Some public goods may take on the
exclusive characteristics of a private good as their use increases to the point of congestion,
when an additional person's use interferes with or excludes another person's use. Id at
260. A public highway, for example, may be a public good until the point where traffic
volume causes one additional motorist to exclude another motorist's use of the highway.
'0 Id at 259.
" Sichel & Eckstein, Basic Economic Concepts at 259 (cited in note 28).
32 Id.

3' Id at 260.
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good because each gallon can be used by one consumer only to
the exclusion of another consumer.
The nonexcludability and nonrival features of public goods
threaten the ability of an original supplier of goods to recover her
investment.34 Nonexcludability means that she cannot systematically refuse to supply the good to nonpayers while supplying it to
payers. Nonrivalness means that each customer becomes a potential competing supplier. 5 Thus, public goods, and goods that
have some public-good characteristics, have a higher free-ride
potential." Conversely, the stronger the characterization of a
product as a private good, with its' commensurate increase in
exclusivity, the lower the free-ride potential. A drive-in movie, for
example, has public-good characteristics. It is nonrival and it is
difficult to exclude viewers. Nonpaying viewers may not be able
to hear the movie, but they can still see it and free ride to an extent. The same movie takes on private-good characteristics when
shown in a private theater. It then becomes possible to exclude
people from enjoying the movie altogether, ending the free-rider
threat. Thus, as the movie takes on more private-good characteristics, its free-ride potential decreases.
A dichotomous private/public good distinction may not be
helpful in determining free-ride potential since few goods are
pure public goods.37 An information product is not a pure public
good, but rather a public good with private-good characteristics.
The consumption of information does not necessarily reduce the
amount available for another user's consumption and is therefore
nonrival-a characteristic of a public good. Reading the informa-

Id. Sichel and Eckstein cite the examples of a person who listens to an open-air
concert or watches a baseball game through a fence, but does not pay for these services.
Sichel & Eckstein, Basic Economic Concepts at 260 (cited in note 28). The nonexclusivity
of the concert and the game allow the nonpaying consumer to enjoy the good's benefit.
" Both nonpaying consumers and competing suppliers in the situation described can
be termed "free riders" or "free loaders" or "pirates." The most significant economic threat
comes from competing suppliers, and it is that type of free riding on which this Article
concentrates.
The potential for a free ride exists when a competing supplier gets the benefits of
the originator's investment without having to pay for it.
"7 Fire protection and radio signals are examples of goods that have strong publicgood characteristics, but are not pure public goods. Sichel & Eckstein, Basic Economic
Concepts at 259 (cited in note 28). It is difficult to exclude the benefits of these goods from
certain community members, but those living closer to their source may enjoy them more

fully than others. Id. All members of a community may enjoy protection by their local fire
department, but families living across from the firehouse may be safer than those living
farther away. Id. Similarly, those living closer to a radio tower may enjoy a clearer signal

than others.
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tion contained in this Article, for example, does not reduce the
amount available for the next reader. On the other hand, a consumer can be excluded from using an information product until
he pays-a characteristic of a private good. The same reader may
be excluded from reading this Article until he, or a library, has
purchased the book. To determine its free-ride potential, a
product's public/private good features must be evaluated carefully.
Most information products are not perfect public goods because excludability is possible at some cost, depending on the
technology. Indeed, even the light from the lighthouse-the classic example of a public good-may be handled as a private good
in some circumstances.' When exclusion is feasible, it often
represents a transaction cost both to producer and consumer. The
originator must erect barriers, such as fences-electronic or otherwise-to keep nonpayers out, and consumers must deal with
these barriers in order to strike a bargain. An example familiar
to lawyers is the interposition of login routines before one can
access Lexis/Nexis. Lexis/Nexis had to pay the cost of establishing and maintaining this login routine as a kind of fence around
its information products. Consumers must pay the cost of remembering their login names and passwords and logging in each time
they wish to consume some information.
The nonrival feature also represents a transaction cost, but
only to the producer. The first consumer, having paid only for his
consumption, can transfer a copy of the information to another
consumer--or would be seller-without losing his own ability to
consume. This means every consumer becomes an alternative
source of supply at only the cost of copying. This transaction cost
presents a challenge for the initial negotiations between originator and initial consumer to impose conditions on the consumer's transfer of a copy of the information.
Together, the transaction costs arising from nonexcludability
and nonrivalness have justified the establishment of property
rights, represented by traditional copyright, patent, and trademark rights.39

'

See Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J L & Econ 357 (1974) (explaining

that lighthouses in England were mainly financed by tolls collected at ports near the
lighthouse).
' A fourth form of intellectual property, trade secret, is better understood as a liability rule under the analytical framework developed by Calabresi and Melamed. See
Calabresi & Melamed, 85 Harv L. Rev at 1094-95 (1972) (cited in note 7) (explaining
applicability of Coase theorem to property and liability rules).
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C. Information and Tomatoes
As the preceding section noted, the features of information
technology and networks complicate the utilitarian calculus. They
are Coasian transaction costs. For example, suppose someone
devotes much effort to discovering all of the servers on the
Internet that contain information about China, believing that
such information would be useful to businesses desiring to develop Chinese markets. He carefully collects the universal resource
locators ("URLs") for the servers and the particular locations
(files and directories) on the servers where the Chinese information may be found. He assembles the URLs into a logically organized set of Web pages so that anyone with access to his Web
server can easily find and obtain copies of specific information
about China.
The entrepreneur occupies a different economic position from
someone who has, for example, grown a crop of tomatoes. Like
the farmer, the Web entrepreneur can deny access to his product
until he is paid. Unlike the farmer, however, the Web entrepreneur faces competition from his customers. The farmer's customer, having bought one tomato, has only one tomato. While she
may resell that tomato, her resale does not deprive the farmer of
anything. The farmer has already been paid. This characteristic
of the tomato is "rival," signifying that two persons may fight
over the tomato, but that they cannot both have exclusive possession of it.
Unfortunately for the Web entrepreneur, his products may
be nonrival, ° depending on how he packages and sells them.' If
he transfers the entire collection of Web pointers to each customer, the customer easily can make copies of the set of pointers and
sell the copies. The nature of digital technology makes the cost of
copying very low. Thus, the customer can keep what she bought
and also sell one or more copies. 4 ' The economic reward gives
her an incentive to engage in the copying. The customer is better

40

See Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public

Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S Cal L Rev 577, 580-81 nn 11-12 (1995)
(discussing public-goods characteristics of nonrivalness and appropriability and comparing
berry patches with private goods); Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of
Intangibles, 94 Colum L Rev 2579, 2587-88 (1994) (explaining how public-good characteristics of intellectual property can lead to market failure); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 Yale L J 1533 (1993) (comparing agricultural commodities and intellectual
property and emphasizing public-goods characteristics of intellectual property).
"' The nonrival character of information means she can have her cake and eat it too.
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off if she sells the copies for any amount of money greater than
her cost of copying.
The nonrival character of digital information has two implications for our Web entrepreneur, both of them bad. First, the
possibility of copying means that he is deprived of the sales made
by his customer. Second, because his customer did not have to
incur the costs of discovering the information and assembling the
pointers, she can price them much more cheaply and still cover
her costs-essentially, the mere cost of copying. Either the Web
entrepreneur will not be able to sell anything because he maintains a higher price, sufficient to cover his higher costs; or, in
order to compete effectively, he must price below his total cost,
thus eventually driving himself out of business. This teaches the
entrepreneurs a lesson-do not invest your energy in creating
products like this because you will not be rewarded.
The foregoing parable explains the justification for the reproduction right in copyright law. In some respects this reproduction
right seems similar to the traditional property interest that the
farmer has in his tomato. Just as taking the farmer's tomato
without his permission constitutes the tort of conversion, so also
reproducing the Web entrepreneur's set of Web pointers without
his permission may be copyright infringement.
There are, however, two difficulties with the analogy. First,
unless the reproduction right is carefully limited, it may represent a significant barrier to the very activity it seeks to encourage." The consumer of the information product may need to
reproduce the product to use it. Some reproduction of information
products may be necessary to build other information products.
Second, a special reproduction right may not be necessary. A
conventional property interest, sufficient to protect the farmer
42 Copyright seeks to encourage production of information value. See Feist Publica-

tions, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340, 349-350 (1991) (explaining justification for copyright). But copyright actually may have the effect of decreasing such production:
Although increased copyright protection may encourage the production of more
copyrightable work, some of which might not otherwise be created, it also increases the price of intellectual works for consumers, and so reduces the dissemination and availability of such works. In some cases, those consumers may be
* producers of further works. Thus, the number of intellectual works in the community may be reduced and the .speed at which the works are disseminated
reduced. Limiting the defusion of expressions also limits the defusion of the
ideas underlying those expressions.
Australian Economic Analysis of Copyright Report at 13 (cited in note 25).
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against the theft of his tomato, also may be sufficient to protect
the Web entrepreneur against the theft of the fruits of his labors.
The exclusivity characteristic concerns means employed by a
producer to exclude a consumer. A theater owner, for example,
excludes consumers by showing his movie only within an enclosed theater and only admitting paying patrons. The movie is
nonrival, but excludable. A recent study for the Australian government identified several features of publishing markets that
could allow returns for a first publisher to remain high enough to
cover the costs of producing the original, thus obviating the justification for intellectual property under the public-goods rationale.' These features include lead time, costly copying, less
than perfect copies, inability to use copies without support and
assistance from the originator, and collusion between potential
copiers and originators."
Consider the efficacy of conventional property interests. The
farmer benefits from these interests by fencing his tomato patch
and asserting control over his stall in the marketplace. Anyone
who takes tomatoes from the patch or the stall and sells them
without the farmer's permission commits the torts of trespass to
land,45 trespass to chattel,46 or conversion,47 and the crimes of
theft,48 burglary,49 or defiant trespass." The rationale for
these torts and crimes is the prevention of conduct inconsistent
with the farmer's property interests in the tomatoes. Trespass,
conversion, larceny, and burglary are applicable to information
resources. If one fences off the information wares in one's computer, unauthorized entry may be remediable by property-oriented torts, such as trespass or conversion, and property-oriented
crimes, such as burglary or larceny."' Some new form of legal
protection or property interest is necessary only when conventional property interests are insufficient. Historically, protecting
against theft of the tangible object in which intellectual property
was embodied, such as a book, protected the author and publish-

4 Australian Economic Analysis of Copyright Report at 14 (cited in note 25).
44 Id.
45 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965).
- Id § 217.
§ 222A.
" Model Penal Code § 223 (1985).
49 Id § 221.1.
'0 Id § 221.2.
" See Ga Code § 16-9-93 (1992) (defining computer theft); Iowa Code Ann § 716A.9
(1993) (defining computer theft); Minn Stat Ann § 609.89 (1987) (defining computer theft);
RI Gen Laws § 11-52-4 (1994) (defining computer theft).
47 Id
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er to some degree, but did not protect them against the prospect
that someone would copy the contents of the book and resell it.
In the electronic context, it is important to identify the difference
between theft of the tangible artifact and free riding on the intangible intellectual property. If technology makes it more difficult to steal the content of the "book" after buying or stealing the
book, the gap to be filled by intellectual property, as opposed to
conventional property, may be smaller.52
Regardless of the respective roles that conventional and
intellectual-property concepts play, all forms of property are
limited by the needs of the larger society to do things that in
some sense diminish the economic expectations of the property
owner. For example, owners of real property never have enjoyed
the privilege of engaging in conduct that constitutes a nuisance. 3 Early in the twentieth century, the common-law courts
established that owners of real property do not enjoy the right to
restrict flights over their property at reasonable altitudes.'
More recently, environmental law has imposed further restrictions on property owners' rights and privileges.5 Taking of private property, though entitling the property owner to compensation, similarly represents a limitation on uninhibited exploitation of private property. In all of these traditional examples, the
law strikes a balance between the utility of private property and
the utility of public use of what otherwise would be within the
scope of private property.
The same balancing occurs in an intellectual-property regime. Absolute ownership of information potentially blocks use of
the owned information. Since all information in some sense is
derived from other information, ownership of information must
be limited in order to avoid preemption of the information base
from which public debate and various economic activities can
take place. 6
52 Changes in technology also can change cost functions and change the relationship

among fixed and variable costs and the importance of sunk costs, all of which affect freeride potential, as explained in Part II of this Article.
"' William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 216-19 (Callaghan &
Co., 2d ed 1879) (summarizing cause of action for nuisance).
' See generally San Diego Unified Port District v Superior Court, 67 Cal App 3d 361,
136 Cal Rptr 557 (1977) (preempting trespass claims resulting from aircraft overflight).
" See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 (1992) (recognizing proposition that environmental restrictions on property use could constitute a taking
compensable under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Penn Central Transportation
Co. v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978) (reviewing framework for analyzing regulatorytaking claims).
' Feist, 499 US at 349-350 (explaining why copyright must be limited); Sony Corp. v
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II. ECONOMICS OF FREE RIDING

A. Coase's Caution
Professor Coase appropriately cautioned that policy judgments about his theorem and about transaction costs should be
based on real-world facts, not on theory:
[H]ow is it that these great men have, in their economic
writings, been led to make statements about lighthouses which are misleading as to the facts, whose meaning,
if thought about in a concrete fashion, is quite unclear,
and which, to the extent that they imply a policy conclusion, are very likely wrong? The explanation is that
these references by economists to lighthouses are not
the result of their having made a study of lighthouses
or having read a detailed study by some other economist. Despite the extensive use of the lighthouse example in the literature, no economist, to my knowledge,
has ever made a comprehensive study of lighthouse
finance and administration.[5 7 ] The lighthouse is sim-

Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 431-32 (1984) (noting that limited scope of copyright reflects balance of competing claims on public interest; creative work must be
encouraged but private motivation must ultimately serve cause of promoting broad public
availability of information). See generally L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg, The
Nature of Copyright:A Law of Users' Rights (University of Georgia Press, 1991) (arguing
that copyright law should be interpreted to recognize users' rights as well as authors'
rights).
"7 Professor Coase later suggested that perhaps the light from lighthouses is not a
public good-at least on the excludability dimension:
The early history [of the British lighthouse system] shows that, contrary to the
belief of many economists, a lighthouse service can be provided by private enterprise. In those days, shipowners and shippers could petition the Crown to allow
a private individual to construct a lighthouse and to levy a (specified) toll on
ships benefitting from it. The lighthouses were built, operated, financed and
owned by private individuals, who could sell the lighthouse or dispose of it by
bequest. The role of the government was limited the establishment and enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse. The charges were collected at the
ports by agents for the lighthouses. The problem of enforcement was no different
for them than for other suppliers of goods and services to the shipowner. The
property rights were unusual only in that they stipulated the price that could be
charged.
R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J L & Econ 357, 375 (1974) (cited in note
38).
If a lighthouse owner knows when each ship needs the services of the lighthouse,
and if only one ship is within range of the lighthouse at any moment, excludability is
perfect because the light could be shut off when nonpaying ships come in range. Id at 375-
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ply plucked out of the air to serve as an illustration.
The purpose of the lighthouse example is to provide
"corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative."
This seems to me to be the wrong approach. I think
we should try to develop generalisations which would
give us guidance as to how various activities should
best be organised and financed. But such
generalisations are not likely to be helpful unless they
are derived from studies of how such activities are actually carried out within different institutional frameworks. Such studies would enable us to discover which
factors are important and which are not in determining
the outcome and would lead to generalisations which
have a solid base. They are also likely to serve another
purpose, by showing us the richness of the social alternatives between which we can choose.58

Professor Coase's caution is particularly appropriate when
one thinks about new information technologies. The application
of the Coase theorem to markets for information is debatable.5 9
New information technologies may be misunderstood by
policymakers and commentators. And, even if policymakers and
commentators understand these technologies, the use of simplifying metaphors may obscure important realities. This Article argues that it is useful to begin with the actual transactions that
occur in new cyberspace technologies. Those technological realities suggest that there may be important sources of excludability
and rivalness for information products in the new environments
that undercut any arguments in favor of expanding intellectualproperty protection. As a recent report commissioned by the Australian government said, "[t]he ... onus is on those advocating
any expansion of copyright protection to show on a case-by-case
basis that such extension would benefit producers and consum60
ers."

76 n 43.
Id at 374-75 (internal citation omitted).
See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase and Intellectual Property, 94
Colum L Rev 2655, 2657-58 (1994) (noting difficulties in judging an argument over existence of externalities in intellectual-property field).
' Cover letter accompanying Australian Office of Regulation Review, and Economic
Analysis of Copyright Reform (1995) (cited in note 25).
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Of course, one must be careful not to build policy on transitory technology applications. For the foreseeable future, however,
it is safe to assume that computers will be used to process information, that they will be connected in networks, that the networks will use open standards for their connections, and that the
capabilities popularized through the Web will continue to be
exploited. Thus, the Web model is not likely to become irrelevant
any time in the near future.
Technology in the Web plays two important roles in analyzing the role of intellectual property. First, it reduces the
nonexcludability and nonrivalness characteristics that justify
intellectual-property protection. In this role, features of the technology that impose zero or only slight transaction costs between
originator and initial consumer, while imposing very high transaction costs on potential free riders and pirates, reduce the overall transaction costs justifying intellectual property. Second,
because the transaction costs resulting from the Web technology
are asymmetric, they may not justify new configurations of property and liability entitlements in the evolution of intellectual
property.
One justification for special property rules for information is
the inability of the originator and initial owner of intellectual
property to recover the cost of creation because of the potential of
free riding."' This argument suggests that, absent legal protection, the market will not produce enough information. Pirates do
not have to repeat the investment of the creator, and thus can
sell the creator's product at the marginal cost of copying, forcing
the creator to price at the marginal cost of copying in order to
retain any market share.6" At this price, the creator will never
recover her fixed costs of creation.
Intellectual property law remedies this problem by increasing the pirate's costs.6" Under a regime of intellectual property,
the pirate faces not only the marginal cost of copying, but also

61 David H. Kramer, Who Can Use Yesterday's News?: Video Monitoring and the Fair

Use Doctrine, 81 Georgetown L J 2345, 2360 (1993) (arguing that "socially desirable
transfers between copyright holders and individuals.., might not occur through the
market" because of transaction costs and the free-rider problem).
62

Id.

' It may seem paradoxical that one reduces the transaction costs that justify intellectual-property law by increasing.transaction costs to pirates. Two different kinds of
transaction costs are involved. The first type is within the broad definition that encompasses impediments to negotiations, such as lack of excludability. The second type increases excludability and therefore decreases the first type of transaction cost by making
it more difficult for a pirate to obtain and resell information without paying for it.
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legal costs, which represent his expected liability." A real pirate, moreover, faces additional costs. He must acquire the pirated information, transform it into a form that he can resell, and
market it.
The costs of originator and pirate can be expressed in equation form. The originator's costs are:
co=c c c Cm cr
where c. is the cost of creation, for example, payments to the
author; ct is the cost of chunking and tagging, or otherwise preparing the information for publication; cm is the cost of marketing, including promotional expenses, distribution costs, and costs
of billing and collection; and Cr is the cost of copying or reproduction.
The pirate's costs can be expressed as:
cp=c. Ct Cm Cr C11
where ca is the cost of acquisition, for example, finding and downloading the material a pirate intends to resell; ct is the cost of
transformation;" cm is the cost of marketing; cr is the cost of
copying; and c. is the pirate's cost of legal liability. There is no
reason to expect that the pirate's marketing or copying costs will
be lower than those of the originator.6 6
A free-ride problem exists only if the pirate's costs are less
than the originator's costs, in other words if
c

Ct>Ca Ct cul.

Professor Hardy's article, 7 the White Paper," and other
commentaries about property in cyberspace assume that c. c t is

The expected liability in turn is a function of the probability of detection, the
probability that a copyright owner could prove infringement, and the expected damages
resulting from a judgment for the copyright owner.
In conventional publishing, this would be the cost of typesetting and manufacturing.
6
Indeed, the originator's learning curve and lead time probably will be such that
her marketing and reproduction costs will be lower at any point in time than those of a
pirate. But for the purpose of simplicity, this Article initially assumes that the marketing
and copying costs are the same for both originator and pirate. When the effect of the
originator's lead time is considered, the assumption is relaxed.
67 Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U Chi Legal F 217
(cited in note 8).
6 United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual PropertyRights (Sept 1995) ("White Paper") (cited in note 5).
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much greater than ca ct, and therefore that the value of c must
be increased to maintain the current level of free-riding risk.
This Article argues that that may not be so. In particular, it
argues that products can be designed so as to increase ct to the
point where it counterbalances any reduction in cl, that results
from cyberspace technology. Product design can increase the
benefits of the originator's lead time, thus increasing the probability of recovering fixed costs before the pirate can establish a
market presence. Finally, the Article argues that payments can
be transferred from those who gained from a relatively frictionless cyberspace6" to creators who otherwise face free-riding
risks.
When fixed investment is large compared with variable costs
of production, free riding on the first producer's investment becomes a possibility. The imitator free rides by producing the
same product at marginal costs close to those experienced by the
innovator, but avoids the fixed costs incurred by the innovator.70
It is not necessary that the free rider have no fixed costs; only
that the free rider's fixed costs be less than the first producer,71
and that his marginal cost not be so much higher than the first
producer's7" as to cancel the advantage of lower fixed costs. Accordingly, the free rider faces a lower average total cost and enjoys a price advantage over the innovator. The greater the free
ride, the greater the cost advantage.
But there are countervailing considerations. The monopolies
created by intellectual property may be unnecessary where significant economic barriers to entry exist.73
The frictionless condition refers to minimization of transaction costs otherwise
associated with complex new schemes of intellectual-property protection or technological
protection for creative works.
"0 In the conventional analysis of the economics of information, fixed costs usually
means cc-the originator's cost of creation-and the analysis ignores the pirate's fixed
costs, ca, ct, and cm.
"' It is also necessary that the first producer's fixed costs be sunk. Sunk costs are
costs that the producer cannot recover by transferring to another through sale or lease. If
the first producer has low fixed costs, relative to total costs, it becomes less likely that
sunk costs are important. If fixed costs are relatively more important, the potential for
important sunk-cost considerations increases.
72 As might occur because of the learning-curve effects of the originator's lead time.
7' See C.C. von Weizacker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 Bell J Econ
399 (1980). A barrier to entry is defined "as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of
output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne
by firms already in the industry." Id at 399. See also Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev 305 (1992) (arguing that the purpose
of patent law is to limit rent dissipation); Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation through Patents: Or Less is More, 78 Va L Rev 351 (1992) (com-
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First, the potential free rider may not be able to avoid fixed
costs to any great degree.7 4 An example outside the information
industry is the imitation of a new aircraft technology by another
producer. The detailed engineering design and tooling required
by the copier potentially overshadows the original producer's
investment.7 5 Second, there are delays before any copier can realize earnings from free riding.7" Third, the first innovator gains
reputational advantages, which assist in differentiating that
producer's product from those of imitators. Fourth, the first innovator has a head start in taking advantage of learning-curve cost
advantages which can deter entry and result in supranormal
profits while the technology matures. Finally, firms already in a
market use existing market structures to deter new entrants who
lack production facilities, managerial experience, and channels of
distribution.7 7 In one survey, being first with an innovation,
moving quickly down the learning curve, and having superior
sales or service efforts exceeded patents as means of appropriating the benefits from innovation.7" Similar barriers to successful
entry can operate in the information industry.
In addition to the differences between fixed and variable
costs, other barriers to entry by pirates may exist. Some fixed
costs may represent transferable rather than sunk costs and thus

menting on Grady and Alexander article); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent
District:Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 Va L Rev 359 (1992) (commenting on Grady and Alexander article).
" Landes and Posner note that copiers may have positive fixed costs, though one
would expect those fixed costs to be lower than those of the original publisher. William M.
Landes and Richard A- Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud
325, 329 (1989).
"' Other surveys suggest that patents are very important in pharmaceuticals and
other chemicals but less important in other industries, including "instruments." F.M.
Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 629 (3d
ed 1990). But see the "self regulating" argument in choreographic protection. One estimate, reported by Professor Scherer, suggests that research and development costs of
duplicating major unpatented new products exceeds 50 percent of the original innovator's
costs. Id at 627 (reporting work by Richard Levin et al, "appropriating the returns from
industrial research and development," in Brooking's Papers on Economic Activity at 809
(no 3 1987)).
7' Landes and Posner suggest that new technologies reduce the importance of this
advantage because they reduce the cost of making copies and permit copies to be made
more quickly. Landes & Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 330 (cited in note 74).
7
Scherer explains why monopolistic competition is a structure that produces more
innovation faster than either pure monopoly or perfect competition, Scherer & Ross,
IndustrialMarket Structure and Economic Performance at 630-42 (cited in note 75), and
that much innovation occurs from small new entrants who apparently were able to move
more quickly with fewer inhibitions resulting from existing market share. Id at 652-653.
71 Id at 628 (citing and reporting results from Levin).
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be less at risk. Publishers can reduce the incidence of sunk costs
by automating certain publishing processes. Lower sunk costs
reduce the amount of fixed investment available for free riding.
Fixed costs may be broken down into two separate components: sunk costs and transferable costs.7" Sunk costs are product specific and the producer cannot recover them through sale or
lease.8" If an investment can be used for other purposes, it does
not represent a sunk cost."' Only the sunk portion of that investment is free rideable, because only it represents irreversible
investments." Transferable costs, however, are not free rideable
because the initial producer can sell the investment, recover its
cost, and negate any cost advantage held by the free rider. Thus,
free rideability depends on whether a significant part of a first
producer's costs are sunk. Investment risk to an innovator decreases commensurately as it moves from irreversible to reversible investments 8 3-from sunk to transferable costs. A first producer will be much more willing to enter into a venture with
lower investment risk represented by lower sunk investment.
Labor, a major sunk cost, illustrates this point. Technological

"' Traditional microeconomic analysis characterizes costs as fixed or variable, but for
our purposes of determining free-ride potential, a sunk/transferable distinction is preferable.
0 Professors Eaton and Lipsey illustrate sunk costs with two opposing illustrations.
At one extreme is a natural monopolist who has no sunk costs. This might occur "if
capital were not product specific and could be bought, sold, and rented on perfect markets." B. Curtis Eaton and Richard G. Lipsey, Exit Barriersare Entry Barriers:the Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry, 11 Bell J Econ 721, 722 (1980). Because there are
no sunk costs, the market is contestable at each moment. At the other extreme is a
natural monopolist with a "permanent commitment" to the market. Id. "[A]s long as he
can cover his avoidable costs he will remain in the market." Id. See also B. Curtis Eaton
and Richard G. Lipsey, Capital,Commitment, and Entry Equilibrium, 12 Bell J Econ 593,
594 (1981) (explaining that sunk costs are costs invested in product-specific capital determined in larger part by its durability and divisibility).
" An example of a sunk cost is the cost charged to an online database subscriber for
so many minutes of use of a particular Lexis or Westlaw database. Once a user's connect
time has elapsed, the cost has been incurred. It is not recoverable through sale or lease
since a subscriber has paid for a privilege that is no longer available. However, if a set of
bound reporters are purchased instead, a transferable cost is incurred because the purchaser can readily resell the books.
2 Most of the literature on sunk cost focuses on economic incentives and
disincentives for a firm considering entry into a market in which at least one other firm is
operating successfully. For such potential new entrants, the risk is greater if the investment is irreversible. Building a railroad, for example, is riskier than starting an airline or
a truck line because the cost of the right of way and track are sunk, while there is no
equivalent investment in trucking or airlines.
' Although a free rider can appropriate the value generated by an initial producer's
transferable costs, there is no free riding on the transferable cost because it can be sold.
This results in no cost advantage to the free rider.
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progress in electronic publishing has transformed labor-intensive
activities into capital-intensive activities. The widespread use of
computers in information production has made this apparent.
When production is more labor-intensive, sunk costs are more
likely because, once expended, labor cannot be used for another
product.' However, as production becomes more capital-intensive, sunk costs become less likely because capital may be more
easily sold or transferred for another use. 5 Accordingly, as information production-that is, electronic publishing-becomes
more capital-intensive, transferable capital costs replace sunk
labor costs. As these sunk costs decrease, free rideability decreases accordingly. 6

For example, the cost representing the labor invested in creating the content for an
information product is nonrecoverable. This cost is only recoverable by selling the information product. However, the transferability of the value created by the labor does not
change its sunk-cost character. When discussing sunk costs, we look at transferability of
inputs, not outputs. A sunk cost is a specialized investment having no value independent
of the product in which it is embodied.
5 Agriculture exemplifies a labor-intensive activity that has become increasingly
capital-intensive. Agricultural machine technologies require less labor by intensifying use
of capital, thereby decreasing agriculture's sunk costs because of the transferability of
farm machinery.
Electronic publishing illustrates this same shift in the information-production
industry. Activities involved in information production, such as chunking and tagging or
creation of internal and external pointers, were at one time labor-intensive and represented sunk costs. However, its increased capital-intensity reduces these sunk costs. To
illustrate, under older technologies, the labor expended in editing a manuscript represented a sunk cost. Using word-processing technology to automate this process makes it
increasingly capital-intensive, and has reduced the producer's sunk costs. The investments in the necessary desktop computers and word-processing software represent
transferable costs. While actual labor, a sunk cost, has decreased, the transferable costs
involved in word processing have increased.
" Professor Breyer noted that increased technology actually increases a subsequent
producer's cost advantage because the cost of copying decreases. Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer
Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281, 298-299 (1970). While this may be true of products with
high authorship value, it does not necessarily follow for those with low authorship value.
Certain information products rely exclusively on information in the public domain
and have little to no authorship value. The human labor expended on content value
represents a major sunk cost because of its nontransferability (assuming the absence of
copyright protection). Accordingly, authorship value is dropped from consideration for
these products, leaving only the labor and resources invested in the actual production as
relevant economic considerations for free-ride potential. These costs are characterized as
sunk and transferable costs as well.
A typical producer of an information product would have a cost function of:
C=f(c,,c,)
where cs represents sunk costs and ct represents transferable costs.
A producer of fiction novels, for example, faces this cost function. Using typical print-
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Technological Risks to Intellectual Property
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The introduction to this Article acknowledged that new information technologies disrupt historic balances between competing
interests in intellectual property, but urged that appraisal of the
disruptions focus on the specific free-riding and piracy risks created by the new technology. Acceptable balances among competing interests have been worked out reasonably well in electronic
technologies used by proprietary, host-based electronic publishing
systems. Before considering new challenges presented by open
network environments like the Internet and its World Wide Web,
one should consider how the balances have been struck in the
more traditional electronic environments. This section considers
the scope of legal protection for intellectual property, and the role
of pricing, product design, bottlenecks, and enforceability, in the
context of well-established, host-based, remotely accessible electronic publishing technologies.
Digital information technology emerged- as a possible threat
to intellectual property during the Second World War, when the
first digital computer cracked the first enemy cipher or aimed the
first bomb. 7 The technology reduced the cost of reproduction
nearly to zero and facilitated incorporation of one work into another. These characteristics concerned the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU")8s
and made the position of creators of digital works somewhat
weaker than the position of creators of works on traditional media in terms of overall protection. These technological threats,

on-paper technology, a producer faces a relatively high amount of sunk costs because of
the high amount of labor expended in adding content value, chunking and tagging value,
external-pointers value, and so on. Accordingly, free-rider potential is high, resulting in
the need for copyright protection. However, a producer of a product such as a publicly accessible database, Lexis for example, faces the same cost function, but enjoys a much lower sunk-cost investment. Technology allows this producer to expend little, if any, human
labor in producing these same values. Free riding on this producer's investments is less
likely than free riding on the print-on-paper producer's. Where technology decreases sunk
costs, it may make copying-free riding-more difficult. It would seem, then, that new
technologies affecting products with low authorship value, and a corresponding low sunk
investment, would decrease free-ride potential. However, for products with high authorship value, and relatively higher sunk investment, technology may make copying easier,
as noted by Professor Breyer. Id.
"' See R. Moreau, The Computer Comes of Age: the People, the Hardware, and the
Software (MIT Press, 1984).
" Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 10 (National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works,
1978) (cited in note 3).
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however, have been dealt with in pre-Internet environments
through pricing and product design, as well as modest adaptation
of intellectual
law, especially 9copyright law.
Although property
the case law is
limited, it is reasonably well accepted that a combination of copyright and contract protects the
intellectual property of creators who sell information9 ° on physical media like magnetic and optical disks, and through centralized host-based dial-up services such as CompuServe, America
Online, Westlaw, and Lexis.9 ' In the market segment involving
remote access-the one containing CompuServe, Lexis, and their
competitors-the basic product relationships among content originator, electronic "retailer," and customer are fairly well standardized, although pricing varies considerably. In the typical set of
relationships, the content originator either transfers its copyright
or grants an exclusive license to an enterprise that maintains the
host computers and the dial-up communications facilities. For
example, John Wiley & Sons, a conventional publisher, owns the
copyright and grants a license for certain copyrighted works to
West Publishing Company ("West"), in order to make the works
accessible through Westlaw."2 West, in turn, acquires whatever
copyright interests the publisher transferred to it under the license.93 West also establishes contractual relationships with all
of its customers, limiting what the customers can do with works
accessed through Westlaw and obligating them to pay West according to its price schedule for access to Westlaw. West, under
its contract with Wiley, pays a royalty. In this arrangement,
West is the "retailer," and Wiley is the "originator."94

"

But see West Publishing v Mead Data Central, 799 F2d 1219 (8th Cir 1986).

The intellectual-property problem is broader than protection for computer programs, the subject of the recent "manifesto" in the Columbia Law Review. Pamela
Samuelson, et al, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,94
Colum L Rev 2308 (1994). Property in the information infrastructure includes not only
computer programs-the procedures for handling information-but also the information
content itself. Provisions of the Copyright Act explicitly aimed at computer programs,
such as the archiving privilege, 17 USC § 117 (1994), do not explicitly extend to data such
as messages or files involved in electronic communication and publishing.
" But see Beary v West Publishing Co., 763 F2d 66 (2d Cir 1985) (holding that West
could not be sued for libel for publishing judicial opinion).
"
WESTLAW JW-EMPDIS.
9 See generally United States Naval Institute v Charter Communications, Inc., 936
F2d 692, 695 (2d Cir 1991) (explaining relationship between copyright infringement and
breach of license); Marshall v New Kids On the Block Partnership,780 F Supp 1005, 1008
(SD NY 1991) (same)..
4 Wiley is not actually the originator, but its ownership of the copyright puts it in
the shoes of the originator.

284

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1996:

Figure 1 illustrates the typical centralized-host electronicpublishing concept. The server not only provides pointers and
other finding and retrieval value,95 but it also publishes
content.96 The client deals only with the server, which looks like
a conventional publisher. The host ensures payment for its intellectual property by denying a connection to those who have not
paid or made payment arrangements.
A variety of common pricing arrangements exist.97 For example, some works are available through Westlaw based on payment of the basic Westlaw fee, a combination of monthly and
hourly charges. Access to other works results in a surcharge in
addition to the basic Westlaw subscription fee. The royalty arrangements between originator and retailer also vary. For example, the retailer may keep track of the number of times a particular work is accessed," and make royalty payments to the originator based on numbers of accesses, or it may simply obtain
rights based on payment of a fixed fee for a license of a defined
duration.
In current online electronic-publishing arrangements, the
single bottleneck of the host-based retailer makes intellectualproperty rights sufficiently enforceable to allow creative and
entrepreneurial activity to flourish.9 9 If a customer does not
have a subscription relationship with Westlaw, the customer
cannot obtain any information through the Westlaw service,
because the first step in any dial-up connection is verification of
an active account through an exchange of account name and
password information with the host computer. The originator
depends on this tollgate, defined in an express contract and enforced technologically, to protect its economic interest and to
prevent piracy. The tollgate makes the information product
excludable, thus weakening its public-goods character. The tollgate increases a pirate's c. cost.

See the rectangles in Figure 1.
See the circle in Figure 1.
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., How to PracticeLaw with Computers 501-02 (Practising
Law Institute, 2d ed 1992) (describing Westlaw and Lexis pricing structures).
98 For example, America Online reportedly pays the originator 10-20 percent of the
revenue it receives for particular content. Such an arrangement contemplates some
mechanism for tracking the revenue attributable to particular content items, such as a
pricing scheme that imposes a charge for access to that content.
' De Sola Pool suggests that this technological bottleneck always will be the natural
focal point in intellectual-property regimes. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom
248-50 (Belknap Press, 1983).
'5
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To be sure, the nonrival nature of the digital format permits
free riding and piracy by customers of the retailer. Once someone
accesses a work through Westlaw, the accessor can duplicate the
work and sell it in competition with Westlaw. °° Such conduct,
however, would not only violate the copyright interest of both
originator and retailer, it also would violate the contract between
the subscriber and the retailer. Moreover, the granularity"' of
most works accessible through Westlaw and other host-based
services makes it costly to download large amounts of content, as
would be necessary for one wishing to engage in large-scale illegal redissemination °2 Fine granularity in remotely accessible
databases may not only improve performance of the system for a
consumer, °3 but it may also increase a pirate's costs to the
point that piracy is unattractive.
The existence of a single tollgate makes violations of the
copyright and license agreement relatively easy to prove. Records
on access exist, and unobtrusive codes can easily be inserted in
content to detect unauthorized copies'

°4

The absence of much

case law on license or copyright violations by subscribers to hostbased services is consistent with an acceptable level of compliance with copyright and license terms. If widespread piracy existed, one would expect0 5 a greater incidence of civil and criminal
enforcement actions.

'0

That is, the pirate's cost of transformation, ct, is low.

101

Granularity in this context refers to the size of the information object that can be

accessed with one command. Finely grained information resources would be available only
a screen or paragraph at a time. Coarsely grained information resources would be available one document or file at a time. The usual granularity of Web resources is finer than
resources available through file transfer protocol ("ftp").
"0 Fine granularity increases the pirate's c.. For example, this author's two volume
work, Henry H. Perrit, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, (Wiley Law Publications,
2d ed 1987), is available on Westlaw, but a user does not get access to the entire twovolume work with one request. Rather, each of approximately 250 sections of the work
constitutes a separate Westlaw "document." A pirate wishing to use Westlaw access as the
starting point for illegal redissemination of the entire work would have to download all
250 sections independently. This task would not be impossible, but it would be cumbersome and therefore costly.
103 Fine granularity increases performance for consumers by allowing the consumer to
view a piece of information more quickly, rather than waiting for a larger quantity of
information, such as the entire document, to be downloaded before viewing is permitted.
o This increases the pirate's cl,.
105 But see West Publishing Co. v On Point Solutions, Inc., 1994 US Dist Lexis 20040
(ND Ga, Sept 1, 1994) (enforcing West's copyright in the editorial enhancements it adds to
cases).
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The Internet is a model of an open network architecture that
will likely dominate electronic publishing in the future. The
transaction costs and the resulting possibilities for excludability
and rivalness are significantly different from those of host-based
architectures.
The Internet is an international network of computers and
computer networks connected to each other through routers using
the TCP/IP protocols and sharing a common name and address
space. One can communicate with any computer connected to the
Internet simply by establishing a connection to an Internet router or node. The Internet is not a corporation or administrative
arrangement; it is a method for connecting computer systems.
Voluntary cooperative bodies, such as the Internet Engineering
Task Force ("IETF"), discuss and formulate standards and protocols through documents called requests for comments ("RFCs").
The Internet began in the 1960s with federally subsidized connections among universities and government research laboratories. An "acceptable use policy" limited traffic unrelated to research and education. By 1990, the Internet's potential as a
model for a National Information Infrastructure ("NII") had been
recognized. The federal government began to reduce the subsidy
and to encourage private entities to take over responsibility for
basic communication and traffic management functions, By 1995,
most of the traffic on the Internet involved unsubsidized facilities
and private traffic. The Internet is the archetypical open network.
Widely used Internet applications (in addition to e-mail)
include telnet, a method of establishing a remote terminal connection to another computer across the Internet; file transfer
protocol ("ftp"), a means for transferring files between computers
linked together by the Internet; gopher, a user-friendly menuing
system for making files and text available (now largely replaced
by the World Wide Web); news and newsgroups, means for
electronic discussions in which anyone connected to an Internet
node has access to posted messages and replies to them; and the
World Wide Web.
The World Wide Web ("Web") is a particularly popular application for the Internet. Reflecting the client-server model of computer-program design," 6 the Web makes use of two kinds of
While general purpose computers can be classified in many ways, a useful distinc-
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software: server software and client or "browser" software. The
client and the server work together during a Web session, communicating with each other through messages and files conforming to the hypertext transfer protocol ("http")°7 and hypertext
0 8 Documents formatted
markup language ("html") standards."
in html are displayed by browser software that presents colors,
typeface styles and sizes, and hypertext links as highlighted text,
all according to html instructions or tags.
An increasingly popular form of electronic publishing involves taking documents, graphical images, sound files, or a combination of these, and placing them on a Web server-usually a
small or medium-sized Internet server with several directories
devoted to Web files and the server application software. The
Web is a hypertext system, meaning that a typical Web document
has pointers to other html documents. These other documents
may be located anywhere in the Internet--on a Web server, on
the same server on which the pointer is located, or on other parts
of the same document that contains the pointer.
For example, one could take this Article and organize it for
electronic publishing on a Web server by substituting internal
hypertext pointers for all of the cross references and by substituting external hypertext pointers for all of the reference information in the footnotes. When a Web browser displays the document, each of the pointers, internal or external, would appear as
highlighted text or as a small symbol. A user interested in the
highlighted information would click on the highlighted text with

tion for purposes of this Article distinguishes servers from clients. Servers store and process information for a multiplicity of clients. Servers are usually more powerful than
clients and range in size from slightly souped-up desktop computers using 386, 486, or
Pentium chips, to clusters of the largest mainframe computers. Client computers conceptually can be of any size, but in most configurations familiar to practicing lawyers, the
client computer is the computer with which a human being directly interacts-for example, a notebook or desktop computer. In a typical Lexis session, the computer on the
lawyer's desktop or the terminal in the library is the client, and the array of mainframe
computers in Dayton is the server.
In the client/server model of computer-system design, functions can be allocated
between server and client to optimize performance. For example, in both the Westlaw and
Lexis systems, the client manages the graphical user interface, presenting the appropriate
icons and text on the screen, while the server maintains the data and responds to user
requests for particular statutes o.rcases. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Law and the Information
Superhighway § 1.2 (John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
107 Http is the protocol that defines how Web servers exchange information with, and
respond to, requests from Web clients.
" Html is the protocol for tagging certain parts of a document published on the Web
so that they show up in particular typefaces or styles, or so that they can be used as
pointers to other information objects on the same or other local servers.
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his mouse. This would cause the Web to retrieve the identified
information and to automatically display it on the client screen.

Thus, the Web organizes information distributed across the
Internet. It facilitates unbundling because editors or publishers

interested in collecting resources related to a particular subject
need not obtain or maintain actual copies of the content of the
resources; they can make their knowledge available simply by

writing a Web document that contains pointers to the identified
references and information about the significance of the resourc-

es. The clearest example is a typical law review footnote or citation in a legal brief. One can make the cited case or statute available simply by pointing to it in the law review article or brief. A
user reading the law review article or brief can retrieve the full
text pointed to simply by clicking on the footnote or citation.
Figure 2 illustrates how the Internet and similar architectures permit value-added products to be unbundled, with different elements of the bundle being supplied by different entities.
The bundling of these elements occurs according to the desires of
a particular user at the time the user wants the complete valueadded information product. In this architecture, suppliers of
information content"° supply their content to anyone who
wants it simply by putting files on computers connected to the
Internet, called servers or "content servers."
Those value-added features are supplied by others.11° It is
entirely possible with Internet applications like the Web for an
entity to supply only index or table of contents-type value in the
form of pointers to content. The pointers are implemented
through Web pages and lists or Gopher menus on an Internet
server that offers no other kinds of value. Someone else can provide user-friendly interface software through another server. Yet
another person can provide connection services that permit connections through dial-up telephone lines or through higher speed
dedicated links.
When a user wishes to identify and obtain a particular type
of content, the user interacts with several Internet servers operated by different entities. First, the user establishes a connection
to the Internet through a connection-services provider. The user
then establishes a connection to an index provider. From the

'o
See the circles above the solid line in Figure 2. As Figure 2 indicates, content suppliers may be governmental entities, as for statutes and judicial opinions, or privatesector entities.
"1 See the rectangles below the solid line in Figure 2.
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lists, tables, and menus provided by the index server, the user
identifies one or more items of interest. The index server uploads
the pointers (not the content, because the index server does not
have the content) through the Internet to the user's client computer. Then the user's client computer executes the pointers,
which automatically downloads the identified content from the
content server into the client computer."' 1
This is a kind of assembly line for pieces of information value. It produces the product just in time, rather than producing it
in bulk according to someone else's design. It lets the user design the product on an ad hoc basis.
Such an infrastructure is not only two layered; in many cases
a pointer points, not directly to the full information resource, but
to another collection of pointers, which may point to still other
collections of pointers, and so on, Collectively marking a trail to
the complete resource. The computer programs involved assemble
a trail from the three pointers and then retrieve the desired
content from wherever it resides, directly into the computer of
the requester, without the content having to traverse all the
intermediary computers. Whether an intermediary points directly
or indirectly to the desired resource is inherently an engineering
decision driven by performance considerations. In many cases,
the computer automatically decides to maintain copies of a particular information resource without any human intervention. A
clear example of this is the caching of recently retrieved resources within a Web browser, such as Netscape.
Figure 3 illustrates a typical set of relationships among Web
servers. Web server X (the consumer's intermediary) never possesses the content. It points to server Y (the pure intermediary),
which in turn points to server Z (the originator's intermediary).
Z, in turn, points to the content on the originator's server."'
Transactions 1-6 with servers X, Y, and Z are requests for, and
transmissions of, pointers only. The eventual request for, and

.. To extend the example of publishing this Article on the Web, the University of
Chicago Legal Forum would maintain a Web server (or a page on a Web server) containing pointers to the articles making up this volume. The text of the articles would be maintained on other computers running Web servers, this author's at Villanova
(http//www.law.vill.edu), Professor Hardy's at William & Mary, Professor Post's at
Georgetown, and so on.
112 In some of the discussions below, the infringer is in the position of the originator,
and one can understand the ultimate retrieval of content as referring to retrieval of
infringing material.
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retrieval of, the content transpires entirely between the client
and the content originator, in 7 and 8."'
One must ask two sets of questions. First, what features of
the technology increase excludability and/or rivalness and thus
reduce the need for legal grants of entitlements to stimulate
allocative efficiency? Second, how should one describe the transaction costs confronting various participants in the Web and
draw conclusions about property versus liability-based
entitlements and the identity of beneficiaries? This Article addresses the first question below and discusses different forms of
protection for content. It addresses the second question in Part
III and discusses intermediary liability.
One of the core concepts of the Internet and other open architectures is that information storage and processing functions
are distributed rather than being centralized in a single host.
Another core concept is the absence of proprietary protocols or
technologies that isolate relationships among particular originators, retailers, and customers. Instead of an originator like Wiley
having a single, exclusive relationship with one retailer like West
as in the preceding example, an originator on the Internet is
expected to have a multiplicity of relationships with several retailers. The open and distributed characteristics greatly weaken
the techniques developed in host-based structures for protection
of intellectual property.
The Web is the best example of how a content originator is
threatened. But the Web is also the best example of the potential
of Internet-like architectures for new forms of electronic publishing. In the Web, a content originator publishes his work simply
by placing a file containing the content on an Internet Web server and allowing access to that server and file through the standard Web protocols, http and html. Anyone who wishes to view
or otherwise use that content can do so simply by establishing a
connection to the originator's server and pointing to that file

"' If the content on the originator's server is infringing, the Web server that simply
points to other content servers is rather like someone who gives directions to the dirtymovie studio or the drug dealer. While the supplier of the pointers can be said to be involved in the distribution chain, the operator never comes in contact with the accused
material. Certainly, in the copyright setting, this eliminates prima facie liability because
the server has not engaged in any of the acts reserved exclusively to the copyright owner.
On the other hand, there is the possibility of vicarious liability under other theories.
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with a standard pointer in the URL format.'

A potential pi-

rate's ca is low.

Because search costs would be too great for potential users of
information published in this fashion to know about all potential
sources, the Web depends on a variety of more or less independent intermediaries who add value to the system by supplying
pointers. In other words, someone wishing to access information
from law reviews typically starts with an Internet node known
for identifying legal resources on the Internet"' and finds on
such a service a pointer to a particular law review file on another
Internet node. Frequently, a user goes through two or more such
intermediaries, perhaps beginning with one identifying a broad
range of legal resources, which points to a particular law school,
which in turn, points to a particular law review issue and article.
The breadth of the market reachable by the content originator depends upon a large number of intermediaries pointing to its
works. This is good, for the content originator. His revenue potential is much greater than if he were limited to the market
reached by a single distributor.1 '6 Usually, the content publishers do not have prior arrangements with the pointer intermediaries; indeed, ordinarily they do not even know about and cannot limit who points to their works.1"' This is bad for the content originator. He cannot make contractual arrangements for
royalties or fixed-fee licenses with retailers he does not know. In
other words, the transaction costs of effective licensing are high.
This does not change copyright law, and thus does not
change the copyright protection for the content originator, except
insofar as placement of its work on a Web server impliedly licenses certain uses"' or, less likely, places the work in the pub-

1
An example of a URL is "httpJ/www.law.vill.edu/perritt/ombreport." This points to
a particular computer connected to the Internet (www.law.vill.edu) and further identifies
a particular file on that computer (OMB Report in the subdirectory perritt).
.. For example, httpJ/www.law.vill.edu.
11 See Steve Lohr, On-Line Stars Hear Siren Call of Free Agency, NY Times 37 (Nov
25, 1995) (reporting on growing tendency of content originators, including discussiongroup organizers, to move away from exclusive arrangements with CompuServe and
America Online into nonexclusive distribution through Internet).
117 One can limit access to particular material on an Internet Web server, however,
by
requiring a password to access certain directories and files.
"' The White Paperdescribed the implied-license analysis in the following way:

A nonexclusive license may be implied from conduct. Implied licenses, like oral
licenses, are always nonexclusive in nature and may be limited in scope. Delivery of a copy of a work by the copyright owner to the moderator of a newsgroup
may imply a license to reproduce and distribute copies of the work to the sub-
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lic domain." 9 Effective contract protection for the content originator, however, is more problematic.' While the content originator can post various terms and conditions in its work, or can
post various messages on its Web server, there is no assurance
that an intermediary or an end user will see any of these limitations until it actually accesses the content.
Intermediaries are even less likely than end users to be
bound by posted limitations on use. The intermediary may be
entirely unaware of such posted terms of conditions, never seeing
the content to which it points.' 2 ' The likelihood is somewhat
greater that the end users might be bound by terms and conditions because end users are more likely to read the contents at
some point, and thus become aware of terms and conditions
bound to the content. But even if end users are bound, they are
far less satisfactory defendants, from the originator's perspective, than intermediaries, as in convehtional host-based arrangements. In other words, the bottleneck that is the heart of
intellectual-property protection and host-based networks does not
exist naturally in open network architectures."2

scribers of that newsgroup, but may not be evidence of an implied license to
reproduce and distribute copies to other newsgroups.
White Paperat 116-17 n 424 (internal citations omitted) (cited in note 5).
11

Copyright owners may relinquish their property interest and put their works in the

public domain. Sanga Music, Inc. v EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 55 F3d 756, 759-61 (2d
Cir 1995) (holding that owner of common-law copyright in song placed song in public
domain by teaching it to folk singer without communicating any restrictions except the
hope that he would keep the song alive; applying 1909 statute, Copyright Act of 1909, 35
Stat 1075, codified as amended in 17 USC §§ 1-65 (1940)); White Paper at 15 (cited in note
5). Under the 1909 Act, it was easier to reach a public-domain conclusion because the
author of a work established or maintained a statutory copyright only by complying with
certain formalities, such as including a copyright notice on any published versions of the
work. Sanga Music, 55 F2d at 759-60 (describing formalities and relationship to 1909
Act).
120 Saying that contract protection is problematic is another way of saying that the
transaction costs of effective negotiation are high.
12' Limitations do not bind a person accepting an offer unless they are communicated
to the accepting party in a means likely to give the accepting party actual notice of the
limitations. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 39 (1981). See also American Computer
Trust Leasing v Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F Supp 1473, 1488 (D Minn 1991)
(holding that disclaimers of warranty must be conspicuous). Disclaimers of warranties are
analogous to limitations on the use of intellectual property because both negate rights or
privileges that otherwise may accrue to the transferee of the property. Nevertheless, B
may accept A's offer without subjective intent by B. See generally Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 23 (1981) and accompanying illustrations. Posted terms and conditions on
automatically accessed works are thus the ultimate shrink-wrap license agreement.
.22White Paper § 1.8.d at 103-11 (cited in note 5) (marshalling arguments against
special immunities against copyright infringement for intermediaries in NII). The authors
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Moreover, contract protection is unavailable except when
privity of contract exists. Thus, the originator's contract position
is even weaker with respect to pirates who get access not directly
from the originator, but through others, such as intermediaries
several steps removed. Privity requires either specialized communications, through, for example, Electronic Data Interchange
("EDI") transaction sets, that satisfy requirements for contractual
offer and acceptance without human involvement or contemporaneous human assent to contract terms.
The possibility exists, of course, of refusing intermediary
connections unless prior arrangements have been made with that
particular intermediary. The Internet and Web offer the possibility of allowing access to particular files or directories only to
preauthorized users who give the correct password.'23 The exchange of user-authorization information can be automated to
establish a kind of trusted intermediary network. This technology
permits electronic publishing through the Internet to rely on the
same user account and password protections as host-based services. The possibility of transforming the Internet-like architectures
into something close to host-based architectures, however, is not
a fully satisfactory answer. It vitiates many of the advantages of
an open architecture for new kinds of publishing and blocks the
flow of information, the goal of intellectual property. The transaction costs of making prior arrangements are significant, and a
content originator shrinks his market considerably by allowing
access only through such prearranged intermediaries.
III. INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY AS A COUNTERVAILING PROBLEM
At the same time that open architectures may make it more
difficult for content originators to protect their intellectual property, open architectures also may increase the exposure of intermediaries to liability for intellectual-property infringement.
In the Web, multiple intermediaries may interact to allow a
consumer to retrieve information directly from a content originator.'24 An information object allegedly infringing another's

of the White Paper assert that the intermediary may be in a much better position to police
compliance with intellectual-property law than owners of the intellectual property. Id
§ 1.8.d at 105-06.
" See, for example, http'/www.law.vill.edu:2000 (granting limited access to certain
electronic discussion groups).
124 A Web server typically presents a user with highlighted "hyper-media links" on
menu items representing full-content text, images, sound, or video files. A user retrieves
the indicated item simply by selecting the menu item or highlighted hyper-media pointer.
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copyright may move through several intermediaries in this distribution system. The potential liability of the various intermediaries for copyright infringement is a matter of obvious interest
both to the intermediaries and to the copyright owner alleging
infringement. The copyright owner may perceive the intermediaries as having deeper pockets, or as being more amenable to personal jurisdiction than the originator of the allegedly infringing
object.'25 Targeting the intermediary for a copyright infringement action is natural, considering the traditional role of the
intermediary as a bottleneck on which intellectual-property protection focuses.
It may be relatively easy for the person claiming infringement to establish a violation of one of the exclusive section 106
rights'2 6 by the originator of the allegedly infringing item. The
originator (pirate) almost certainly has reproduced the copyrighted work and also probably helped to distribute it to the public.'27 It is somewhat less clear whether the intermediaries have
infringed any section 106 rights; this depends on the network architecture.
Intermediary liability is more likely in traditional bulletinboard arrangements12 s than in the Web. Consider the case of a
dial-up electronic bulletin board, where any item selected and

This causes the server displaying the pointer to download a short computer-executable
pointer, called a URL, to the user's computer. The user's computer, running Web client
software, then automatically executes the URL to retrieve the information directly from
the computer pointed to by the URL. The first computer that supplied the URL disconnects as soon as it has transmitted the URL to the user. Thus, although it appears to the
user that the first computer retrieves the information item, in fact, another computer
retrieves it. The Web process is commonly replicated through a chain of intermediaries,
the first Web server pointing to another, and the second pointing to a third, and so on,
with each intermediary server simply sending URLs to the customer. This occurs until the
full content of the desired item is finally retrieved. Throughout the chain, a typical user
perceives that everything comes from the first Web-server computer.
125 Another kind of intermediary liability is attractive to originators: contract-based
liability premised on the intermediary facilitating unwanted distribution of the originator's work. In this case, it is the access to original work that constitutes the wrongful
conduct. In the case described in the text, it is access to an infringing work.
.26 17 USC § 106 (1994) (enumerating rights exclusively belonging to a copyright
owner).
127 This violates the reproduction right, 17 USC § 106(1), and the distribution right,
17 USC § 106(3).
12' Traditional commercial host-based information services, considered in Part III of
this Article, are unlikely to face liability for intellectual-property infringement because
they acquire rights to the content which they make available. Bulletin-board operators, on
the other hand, are more likely to serve as conduits for persons who upload files for use
by others. The uploaded files may be infringing, unbeknownst to the bulletin-board operator.
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retrieved actually resides in the form of a file on the intermediary computer." 9 When the user selects a file, including an infringing one, the intermediary computer makes a copy and downloads it to the user's computer. When the intermediary makes
the copy, it violates the section 106 reproduction right; when the
intermediary downloads, it may violate the section 106 distribution right if it is aimed at the "public." The owner of the bulletin board may argue that it did not place the allegedly infringing
item on its computer and did not itself cause the copy to be
made. Rather, one copy was made by the third person placing the
item on the bulletin board, and another by the user retrieving it.
°
Such arguments failed in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v Frena,"3

where the district court found that the operator of the electronic
bulletin board on which third parties placed digitized images of
Playboy centerfolds infringed Playboy's distribution rights as the
content originator. 3 ' Moreover, such a bulletin-board operator
may have publicly performed or displayed the
work 32 when a
33
board.1
bulletin
the
on
material
browsed
user
"

In other words, the computer ultimately transmitting the full-content item is the

same computer that generates the interface made available to the requesting user.
130839 F Supp 1552, 1556 (MD Fla 1993).
See Sega Enterprise, Ltd. v MAPHIA, 857 F Supp 679, 68%(ND Cal 1994) (finding
that uploading of copyrighted material by third party to bulletin board constituted the
making of unauthorized copies attributable to the bulletin-board operator). In Religious
Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F Supp 1361 (ND
Cal 1995), a district court held that a news server was not liable for direct copyright infringement because the copying that occurred in its system was triggered by the acts of a
third party, placing the defendant in a position analogous to the operator of a copy machine, who makes available a process that makes copies under the direction of another.
The court characterized the question as "whether processors of computers are liable for
incidental copies automatically made on their computers using their software as part of a
process initiated by a third party." Id at 1368.
The court gave the following answer:
The court believes that Netcom's act of designing or implementing a system that
automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through it
is not unlike that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the public make
copies with it. [footnote omitted] Although some of the people using the machine
may directly infringe copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner's liability
under the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct infringement.
Id at 1369.
On the other hand, the court found the plaintiff entitled to trial on its allegations of
contributory infringement and vicarious liability, based on the notice of infringement
given by the copyright owner and the fact that the defendant received revenue from the
accused activity. Id at 1373-77.
" Public performance and display are, along with reproduction and distribution,
rights that belong exclusively to the copyright holder'. 17 USC § 106 (1994).
" See United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task
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Intent is irrelevant when conduct falling within section 106
occurs. Playboy Enterprises held that "[iut does not matter that [a
defendant] may have been unaware of the copyright infringement. Intent to infringe is not needed to find copyright infringement."'' In other words, intermediaries are subject to no-fault
liability.'35
Technology matters. The infringement case against intermediaries who provide anonymous ftp sites is essentially the same
as the case against electronic bulletin-board operators. On the
other hand, the case against Gopher and Web servers is more
tenuous. They never have possession of a requested item, which
makes it less plausible that they have reproduced, distributed,
displayed, or performed it.'36 Rather, they are more like providers of bibliographies to works, some of which may be infringing.
Nevertheless, copyright owners may argue that the scope of
the section 106 duties should be extended to intermediaries as
well, because they constitute links in a chain that necessarily
results in the conduct covered by section 106. Copyright infringement is a statutory tort. The causation requirement in tort law
long has been satisfied by the doing of an act intended to and
substantially
certain to result in the injury constituting the
137
tort.

Moreover, even if Gopher and Web-type services do not expose their providers to liability for direct infringement, as in
Playboy Enterprises,they may expose their providers to liability

Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights §§ I(A)(6)(d) at 63-64 nn 221-222 (Sept
1995) ("White Paper") (cited in note 5) (noting that mere file transfer would not constitute
performance, but suggesting that browsing of digitized Playboy images or other works
would constitute a public display). The White Paper notes that "many NII uses would
appear to fall within the law's current comprehension of 'public display."' Id § I(A)(6)(e)
at 65, citing Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v Redd Home, Inc., 749 F2d 154 (3d Cir
1984) (holding video-store operator liable for public performance for renting tapes to
customers who viewed them in semiprivate screening rooms) as authority for proposition
that public-performance concept keeps pace with new technologies for allowing multiple
persons to view stored material.
114 Playboy Enterprises, 839 F Supp at 1559 (finding infringement based both on distribution and display rights).
135 See also MAPHIA, 857 F Supp at 686-87 (holding that even if defendants did not
know exactly when games would be uploaded, they provided facilities, direction, and
encouragement, and thus were liable for contributory infringement).
136 When Web servers cache material, they do reproduce content, and thus may face
greater exposure. See Part V.
137 See Rose v Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 461 SE2d 782, 784 (NC App 1995) (engaging
in conduct "knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury" constitutes a tort
(emphasis in original)).
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for derivative or contributory infringement.138 In Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios, Inc.,39 the leading
case on contributory infringement, the Supreme Court held that
manufacturers of video cassette recorders were not liable for contributory infringement of televised works recorded on their machines by consumers."4 The Court held that systems capable of
substantial noninfringing uses cannot produce contributory infringement."" In order to apply this test to the Gopher or Web
server, one must ask whether the particular server facilitates access to noninfringing information objects. If its purpose is not
infringing, the fact that consumers may occasionally use the
server to retrieve infringing objects does not suffice to establish
contributory infringement by the operator of the server. On the
other hand, if the server has the predominant purpose of facilitating access to infringing objects, the operator of the server
should be liable for contributory infringement.
The White Paper apparently envisions a more extensive role
for contributory liability. In regard to intermediary liability, the
White Paper states:
There is a view that on-line service providers, such as
bulletin board operators, should be exempt from liability or given a higher standard for liability, such as imposing liability only in those cases where infringement
was willful and repeated or where it was proven that
the service provider had both "actual knowledge" of the
infringing activity and the "ability and authority" to terminate such activity. The latter proposed standard
would combine the contributory infringement standard
with the requirements for vicarious liability and apply
it to all infringements (including direct infringements)
of the service provider. Altering the standards of liability for infringement would be a significant departure
from current copyright principles and law and would

'" See Netcom, 907 F Supp at 1373-75 (allowing trial on contributory-infringement
claim).
' 464 US 417 (1984) (5-4 decision).
140 The Court constructed a two-tiered analysis. First, the Court found that the consumer conduct fell within the fair-use definition, and therefore did not constitute infringement at all. Second, the Court held that if the ultimate use of the system was
noninfringing, then there could be no vicarious liability. The second part of the analysis is
of more immediate importance to assessing the possibility of contributory liability by
intermediaries. Sony Corporation,464 US at 421.
"' Id at 440.
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result in a substantial derogation of the rights of copyright owners. It is a42difficult issue, with colorable arguments on each side.
While acknowledging that it is virtually impossible for intermediaries to review messages and files for infringement possibilities contemporaneously, the White Paper also identifies other
actors in the larger information infrastructure confronted with
the same impossibility of screening. These actors include photo
finishers, booksellers, record stores, newsstands, and computersoftware retailers, all of whom nevertheless are subject to strict
liability for infringement." The White Paper also states that
"on-line service providers can certainly investigate and take appropriate action when notified of the existence of infringing material on their systems and thus limit their liability for damages to
those for infringement."'" This has been part of the business
costs for many other information distributors, and the authors of
the White Paper saw no reason that NII intermediaries should be
placed in a more favorable position."
The White Paper then focuses on a subclass of intermediaries. "On-line service providers have a business relationship with
their subscribers. They-and, perhaps, only they-are in the
position to know the identity and activities of their subscribers
and to stop unlawful activities."' This, of course, is not true of
many Web servers. The White Paper acknowledges that "[n]o one
rule may be appropriate." 7 For example, an entity providing:
Only the wires and conduits-such as the telephone
company... would have a good argument for an exemption if it was truly in the same position as a common carrier and could not control who or what was on
its system. The same could be true for an on-line service
provider who unknowingly transmitted encrypted infringing material.'"
The White Paper states that Congress believes that the limitation
on damages for innocent infringers is adequate to protect inter-

142

White Paperat 103 (cited in note 5).

Id at 104.
Id at 105.
145 Id.
141 White Paper at 105 (cited in note 5).
"

'"

141
148

Id at 110.
Id.
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mediaries while sufficient to create incentives for intermediaries
to work with copyright owners and their subscribers to protect
against infringement.149
The White Paper reviews various forms of vicarious liability
as a basis for holding intermediaries liable. The dance-hall cases
justify holding liable any intermediary who authorizes infringing
uses of his facility, such as the sponsor of an anonymous ftp
server or electronic bulletin-board design for uploading infringing
material.150 More broadly, the White Paper suggests that an
intermediary who provides services or equipment relating to the
direct infringement may be liable for contributory infringement."' It also suggests that "infringement liability may be
based on the provision of equipment or other instrumentalities or
goods used in or related to the infringement," 2 acknowledging
Sony. 53 One could interpret the White Paper as arguing for a
very broad regime of contributory infringement that might conceivably even sweep up Web and Gopher intermediaries who
never engage in reproduction or direct distribution of copies.
Even under a more traditional application of infringement
concepts, Web intermediaries might be liable for making and
distributing copies because they use caching. -Caching refers to
the automatic copying of material to improve performance of
computer systems. It is used in wide-area networks like the
Internet to reduce the time required for second and subsequent
access to Web files. Because caching involves copying, it raises
particular concerns about potential copyright violations.
This Article presumes that the supplier of information content has made it available on the Web through a "content server"
("CS"), a Web server from which the content may be retrieved.
The Article further assumes that this content supplier has imposed restrictions on the content thus published, permitting access for purposes of browsing and viewing, but not copying. 54
Caching may constitute prima facie direct copyright infringement. 55 Suppose that there are three entities, besides the con'4
150

Id at 107-08.

"'

White Paperat 99 (describing dance-hall case concept) (cited in note 5).
Id at 100.

152

Id.

" Id. The White Papercites Cable/Home Communication Corp. v Network Products,
Inc., 902 F2d 829, 845-47 (11th Cir 1990), in support of its conclusion that providing facilities can result in contributory infringement. White Paperat 100 (cited in note 5).
" The content supplier might be tempted to permit viewing and browsing, but not
"downloading." The difficulty with this distinction is that downloading is necessary to
permit browsing and viewing on the client computer.
" The approach discussed in this Article involves defining the duplication rights so
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tent server, involved in a Web transaction: an ultimate consumer,
C; another Internet server that provides pointers on its Web
pages to the content server, PS; and fire wall computers, F.
First, suppose C initially establishes a session with PS to
locate material of interest. C finds on PS a pointer to an item on
CS. C clicks on this pointer. As a result, PS automatically
uploads the selected pointer (in the form of a URL) to C's computer.15 Now, the Web-browser software running on C's computer automatically establishes a connection with CS and retrieves the Web file pointed to by the pointer. C's Web browser
caches the retrieved file so that if C requests it again, the cache
copy can be loaded in the browser, rather than the browser having to fetch the file again over the Internet. In this transaction,
PS never had the requested file, either before or after C requested it. Any downloading and caching occurred on the Web-browser
application running on C's client computer.
As a second example, suppose that C's computer connects to
a Local Area Network that in turn connects to the Internet
through a fire-wall computer. While there are a variety of firewall configurations, a common one would cause the fire-wall to
serve as a "proxy" for C. The popular Web-browser software has a
proxy option to accommodate such a fire wall role. The proxy
function is best defined by describing how it works in a Web
transaction. C seeks to establish a connection to PS. The connection request is forwarded to F, which duplicates the request. Any
information returned by PS, including the pointer, is transferred
to F. F then caches the information and sends a copy along to C.
When C's computer activates the pointer to CS, CS returns the
requested file to F, which caches it, and sends a copy along to C.
C also caches it because it is running the same Web browser as
in the first example.
Some Web browsers, such as Netscape, keep the cached material even after the user exits the browser. The next time the
browser runs, the cached files are available to it. An expiration
date, included in the files sent by CS, determines how long a
browser uses a cached version rather than reloading from the
server from which the material originated. CS sets this expira-

that it does not cover caching; an alternative approach would be to define a new privilege,
or to amend the fair-use privilege so that it covers caching.
"
Actually, the page containing the pointer already had been uploaded into C's
computer.
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tion date, but the recipient may change it. 5 ' Thus, it is not factually correct to conceive of the browsers'-and the fire
walls'--caching as ephemeral or transitory.
As a third example, consider an information-services provider such as CompuServe, Prodigy, or America Online. Such a
service provider might want to provide Web access to its customers so that information retrieved through the Web would be more
or less indistinguishable from material retrieved from the provider's host computer. The provider would almost certainly also
cache the Web material on the provider's host, so that if another
subscriber wishes to retrieve the same material, the second subscriber could do so directly from the provider's host computer,
without the host having to go out and fetch the material again
across the Internet.
Despite the engineering benefits of these three types of caching-faster response and less traffic on the network-all three
types involve reproduction and thus potential copyright liability.
The uncertainties confronting intermediaries can lead to a kind
of de facto prior restraint on controversial content. The possibility
of such prior restraint should stimulate more careful consideration of the tension158 between First Amendment and intellectualproperty interests.
Even a fault-based standard forces an intermediary to be the
judge of a copyright-infringement allegation. A mere allegation or
rumor of infringing content may constitute "knowledge," thus
exposing the intermediary to increasing damages the longer it
permits the content to be disseminated through its service. Investigation and adjudication of copyright cases are expensive and require legal expertise. Because intermediaries face almost no
liability if they remove a particular item or a pointer to that
item, the economics of intermediary services dictate that in almost all cases, the intermediary simply will stop disseminating
an item merely on accusation or rumor of infringement.
Even in those instances in which a particular configuration
of technology reduces the risk of no-fault direct infringement, as
in the Web without server caching, intermediaries potentially are
exposed to liability as contributory infringers. For example, a
request to suppress certain material might give the intermediaries sufficient knowledge to make them liable for contributory
infringement under the White Paper formulation.

i

See http//www.ics.uci.edu/pub/ietf/http/draft-ietf-http-vlO-spec-OO.txt.
See Part VI for further analysis of First Amendment issues.
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The White Paper acknowledges that the nature of increasingly complex intermediation technologies makes it infeasible for
many intermediaries to check out the bona fides of the information they assist in disseminating. It may be feasible for a service
provider that actually maintains copies of files and messages on
its own computer to screen for offensive words or identifiable
files. It certainly is not feasible, however, to automate screening
for copyright or trademark infringement, especially for a provider
who merely points to information resources created and maintained by others or who merely uploads textual files. Any attempt at such screening would clog up the dissemination technologies and dissipate their power. "Fair-use" arguments are subtle
and cannot be decided by a computer algorithm, much less an
automated filter that cannot possibly "know" enough about the
surrounding circumstances to determine whether a particular file
or message infringes someone else's copyright. Because of the
volume of messages, inquiry into detailed factual circumstances
would impose a major burden on providers.
Thus, de facto prior restraint will occur because of the combination of the rules of intermediary liability for copyright infringement and the economics of intermediaries in the information
infrastructure. The intermediary will likely impose prior restraint at the first hint of a controversy over intellectual property. The intermediary is subject to an injunction or criminal prosecution in advance of the dissemination, and the possibility of a
damages judgment works to shut down the dissemination just as
effectively.
If courts give intermediaries more guidance as to what does
and does not expose them to liability, and if the law insulates an
intermediary from damages unless and until the intermediary receives a neutral determination that a particular item is infringing, the de facto prior-restraint threat would be reduced.
IV. ENCRYPTION'S POTENTIAL

Encryption is attractive as a way of reducing free-riding
potential without heavy reliance on intellectual-property law and
without relying unduly on intermediary liability. However, there
are important limitations on encryption as a solution.
Content encryption extends technical protection beyond value-added processes to the content itself. A variety of proposals for
digital libraries would rely on encrypted content in order to make
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the otherwise public good excludable.' 59 They all rely on the basic concept that one can decrypt the desired information content
only by using a key for which one would have to pay. Encryption
applications deploy systems that would limit the number of times
encrypted content could be accessed. The systems also would
permit certain types of use and exclude other types, such as replication. Such encryption applications increase the pirate's ca,
potentially to infinity. The same applications permit one to determine with high reliability whether content has been altered, such
as by the removal of various notices and advertisements. ' The
applications increase the pirate's c,,.
Encryption has important limitations, however, that prevent
its use as the main means of protecting intellectual property in
the information infrastructure. Encryption works only when both
the producer and the consumer of information adhere to the
encryption standards. Nothing in the history of developing standards for computer formats suggests optimism about the feasibility of developing a truly universal standard for encryption. 6 '
Nor is it feasible or desirable for the government to mandate
adherence to such a standard. Such a mandate would put the
government in the position of prohibiting expression except
through the approved encryption standard, and that would raise
insuperable First Amendment problems. The experience with the
proposed Clipper-chip initiative discourages enthusiasm about
the potential for government-led standardization of encryption
methods. The original proposal did not contemplate mandating
the use of the Clipper standard. Nevertheless, the outcry against
it was so great that it had to be withdrawn.'62
Moreover, any method of encryption has adverse implications
for information-system performance or reliability. Copy protection
.59Karen Frank and Michael Higgins, Fair Use: In the Courts and Out of Control, 411
PLI/PAT 1 (1995).
"6 See Marvin A. Sirbu, Internet Billing Service Design and Prototype Implementation,
Proceedings: Technological Strategies for Protecting Intellectual Property in the
Networked Multimedia Environment 67 (Interactive Multimedia Association, Jan 1994).
' See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Format and Content Standards for the Electronic Exchange of Legal Information, 33 Jurimet J 265 (1993) (explaining the dynamics of private
standard setting).
" In July 1994, the Clinton Administration abandoned its original clipper proposal.
The Vice President announced that the original Clipper-chip technology would be used for
telephone communications, but that the Administration would launch a five-month study
to develop a new encryption initiative for computer use. The new proposal would be voluntary, would not rely on a classified algorithm, and would be exportable. Holly Bass, U.S.
Scales Back Encryption Plan for Computers, Wall Street J B5 (July 22, 1994) (reporting
on letter from Vice President to Representative Maria Cantwell).
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of desktop-computer software revealed how strongly consumers
resist these limitations. In the face of such consumer resistance,
copy protection that was commonplace in 1985 had virtually
disappeared from mass-marketed computer software by 1995.
One can expect the same kind of resistance with respect to encryption arrangements that sometimes block access by authorized
users and impede performance.
For those markets in which consumer resistance impedes
more profitable and larger scale electronic publishing, adding a
technological basis for additional consumer resistance likely will
not appeal to entrepreneurs who want market development. In
other words, encryption may increase the originator's cm more
than it increases the pirate's c..
Undue reliance on encryption solutions to intellectual challenges could produce a plethora of incompatible encryption systems. A collection of technically isolated archipelagos would exist,
rather than a national information infrastructure, much as the
online information services like CompuServe, America Online,
Lexis/Nexis, Dialog, and Westlaw existed in isolation from each
other before the NII encouraged interconnections and gateways.
Encryption technology is best used not to protect content, but
to facilitate payment systems so that unencrypted content may
be sold cheaply in open network architectures.
V. SOLUTIONS

A regime that protects intellectual property and also shelters
new creative and productive exploitation of information must
target realistic transaction costs that impede bargaining. The attributes of public goods justify the artificial property constructs of
copyright and patent law. The best policy is to leave copyright
law intact, develop a richer array of pricing and business models
for electronic publishing, develop private cooperative arrangements for licensing and policing intellectual property, and extend
the infrastructure for electronic-payment systems.
If the Copyright Act is amended, it should be amended not
only to extend protection for content originators, as the White
Paper suggests, but also to offer certain immunities for intermediaries in open network architectures, and to strengthen the role
of the First Amendment.
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A. Proposals for Expanded Legal Protection Are Unsupported
The Administration's White Paper mistakenly addresses
new technological threats to intellectual property through the law
and through expanding protection for content originators, and it
minimizes the concerns of consumers and intermediaries. While
claiming an intent only to "clarify," the White Paper recommends
the establishment of a new transmission right in copyright law:
It is not clear under the current law that a transmission can constitute a distribution of copies or
phonorecords of a work. Yet, in the world of high speed
communications systems, it is possible to transmit a
copy of a work from one location to another. This may
be the case, for instance, when a computer program is
transmitted from one computer to ten other computers.
When the transmission is complete, the original copy
typically remains in the transmitting computer and a
copy resides in the memory of, or in storage devices
associated with, each of the other computers. The transmission results essentially in the distribution of ten
copies of the work. However, the extent of the distribution right under the present law may be somewhat
uncertain and subject to challenge. Therefore, the
Working Group recommends that the Copyright Act be
amended to expressly recognize that copies or
phonorecords of works can be distributed to the public
by transmission, and that such transmissions fall within the exclusive distribution right of the copyright owner. 16
According to the White Paper,the proposed amendment simply "recognizes" the appropriate scope of the distribution
right.' In the view of the Working Group, the amendment is
necessary, among other things, to make it clear that distribution
in the form of transmission is the exclusive prerogative of the
copyright owner. The distribution right as currently interpreted
covers only "publication."165

16 United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force,

Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:Report of the Working
Group on the IntellectualProperty Rights 192-93 (Sept 1995) ("White Paper")(cited in note

5).
16
"

Id at 193.
Id at 195.
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The White Paperrejects any special safe harbors for intermediaries. While recognizing that intermediaries, such as online
service providers and Internet servers, "play an integral role in
the development of the NII and facilitate and promote the free
exchange of ideas," 6 ' the White Paper suggests that this should
not be grounds for removing or reducing liability for copyright
infringement. "One can perform these functions without infringing or facilitating the infringement of the copyrighted expression
of others."'6 7 The White Paper further argues that intermediaries remain in the best position to detect copyright infringement,
and that they could shift any undue risk of strict liability to their
customers or suppliers through routine contracting arrangements."
The White Paper is troubling because is suggests that fair
use has a narrow scope. It misleadingly de-emphasizes the role of
exploitation of information by downstream authors and publishers as a core part of copyright analysis. In a similar vein, the
White Paper overemphasizes the scope of vicarious liability under
doctrines such as contributory infringement. The White Paper
jumps to the conclusion that more legal protection is needed
without carefully probing the technological and marketing underpinning of such a conclusion.
A number of intellectual-property scholars proposed, in an
extensive article published by the Columbia Law Review in late
1994,169 a new system of protection for computer works. While
this Manifesto is an incisive starting point for reconsidering the
opposing positions in the controversy over protection of "look and
feel" in computer program functioning, 7 ' it is of only limited
use in shaping an appropriate form of property for information
content. The Manifesto characterizes computer programs as processes. The distinction between computer programs and computer

6
'6'
1

Id at 105.
White Paperat 105 (cited in note 5).
Id at 105-06.

x Pamela Samuelson, et al, A Manifesto Concerningthe Legal Protection of Computer
Programs,94 Colum L Rev 2308 (1994) (the "Manifesto").
170 The Manifesto authors started from the proposition that computer programs.
"behave." Id at 2316. The Manifesto authors proposed a blockage period for clones, although they were somewhat ambiguous as to its length. Id at 2414. The blocking period
could differ for different types of original work in clones. It would allow third-party
development but not distribution during the blocking period. A system of registration
could extend the blocking period. Id at 2418. This would be a "light" registration system,
more like copyright than patent, in that there would be no examination. Samuelson, 94
Colum L Rev at 2417 (cited in note 170).
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data is likely to become even more indistinct than at present, as
html tags embody more procedural information and as object-oriented systems such as Java become more common. Information
content, however, will remain more like data than programs. As
such, a process-oriented intellectual-property regime is largely
immaterial to protection of content contributors. Nevertheless,
the Manifesto represents a more useful contribution to the policy
dialogue than the White Paper. The Manifesto seeks to work out
legal protections to fill actual gaps in technological protections of
creative effort, rather than jumping to the conclusion that an
expanded role for the law is desirable.
B. Embrace New Pricing and Business Models
Protecting intellectual property in a flourishing NII depends
more on the imagination of entrepreneurs in designing and deploying new business and pricing models than on legal creativity.
Radio and television patterns should be imitated; they were the
last big revolution in information technology and necessitated
changes in the way intellectual property was handled. To be
sure, radio and television entrepreneurs did not forswear intellectual property, but traditional notions of copyright fit poorly
because radio and television programming was not distributed in
the form of tangible copies. To respond to these challenges, the
entrepreneurs radically changed the location of the tollgate.' 7 '
In cyberspace, new tollgates and new ways of pricing will
enable content contributors to earn a fair return while undercutting efforts by pirates to free ride. For example, the costs of extracting large amounts of content from finely grained retrieval
systems can be substantial. If persons cooperate in the marketing
of information through such systems and set a price that is not
much greater than a pirate's costs to extract the information unlawfully,' then the economic incentives for piracy diminish.
Alternatively, block pricing for access to licensed content on a
nonexclusive basis reduces transaction costs 73 for content contributors and intermediaries. As their transaction costs dimin"' the margin for a pirate diminishes as well.
ish, 74

"' See Note, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox: Keeping the Sound Recording Copyright Viable in the Digital Age, 74 BU L Rev 505, 513 n 45 (1994) (noting that
broadcasters have historically opposed performance rights).
172
173

17'

That is, if P=C. C CmCr.

These transaction costs are c..
This decreases the originator's c. and cr.
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The spread of nonexclusive publishing arrangements can
assure content contributors a greater return because of larger
markets. At the same time, these arrangements reduce the likelihood of closed systems swamping a surrounding open network
architecture and reduce piracy incentives because content is
available to a wider variety of intermediaries who competitively
serve demand better. 7 ' Already, the popularity of the Internet
has changed bargaining power and bargaining positions between
content providers and intermediaries. 7 ' Whether or not authors
agree to exclusive contracts with their publishers is purely a matter of bargaining power and practice.'77
C. Methods of Protecting Content and their Classification
World Wide Web technologies permit the originator of content to protect her investment without relying entirely on intellectual property. These new technology-enabled methods, summarized in Figure 4, fall into three overlapping categories: product
design, business models, and technology.
All three methods reduce the nonexcludability and nonrival
characteristics of content sold by itself.1 78 Product-design methods include planned obsolescence, finer granularity, addition of
presentation markup, bundling vulnerable material to less vulnerable value-added elements, and concentrating investment on
value-added features other than content. Planned obsolescence
decreases the value of the content item that might be subject to
piracy. By the time the pirate brings his copy to the market,
consumers will prefer a more current version from the originator.

' See Steve Lohr, On-Line Stars Hear Siren Call of Free Agency, NY Times 37 (Nov
25, 1995) (cited in note 116) (reporting on growing tendency of content originators, including discussion-group organizers, to move away from exclusive arrangements with
CompuServe and America Online into nonexclusive distribution through the Internet).
176 See Business Wire, Times Will Move TimesLink to the World Wide Web (Sept 27,
1995) (describing Los Angeles Times bypassing Prodigy and publishing directly on the
Internet's World Wide Web).
' For example, this author regularly accedes to exclusive arrangements with his
book publishers, simply because that is the way business is done in book publishing, and
book publishers would be very reluctant to accept a nonexclusive contract. On the other
hand, the author usually extends only a nonexclusive license to law reviews that publish
his articles, because law-review licensing practice is less fnimly established, and the
author has greater leverage.
7' Some transaction costs, like nonrivalness and nonexcludability, make it more
difficult for originators to strike and enforce a bargain that will allow them to recover
their investment. Other transaction costs help the originator distinguish between his
grantee and a pirate, reduce the nonexcludability characteristic of his product, and
therefore enhance his ability to protect his investment.
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Finer granularity and the addition of presentation markup increase c, because the pirate must assemble more grains and remove presentation markup. Finer granularity also may increase
ca because more human intervention likely
will be needed to
179
download a marketable amount of material.
Bundling vulnerable material to less vulnerable value-added
elements increases ca because it becomes more difficult for the
pirate to get to the content he wishes to steal. 8 ' Shifting investment toward value-added elements and away from content
might seem inefficient because it would result in the underproduction of content. But different ways to satisfy consumer needs
exist, some exposing the originator to a lower risk of free riding.
For example, one can author a work so that different structural
components are identified by transitional language in the text.
Alternatively, one can segment the work and make different
parts retrievable separately. Writing the work so that its segments can be identified by text means that investment in structural differentiation is made in the form of compensation to the
author. If one segments the work, one can invest separately in
content authorship and the tags, pointers, and software that
retrieve the individual segments and link them together. The
value-added features are inherently more excludable, potentially
confronting the pirate with very high ca and ct.
A number of feasible business models exist in the Web and
compensate for remaining nonrival and nonexcludability characteristics of content. The producers of downstream value may
make subsidy payments to content producers in order to draw
customers to their access and retrieval systems. They can reduce
the necessary outlays if they cooperate with other producers of
downstream value and make nonexclusive arrangements with
content producers. A variety of institutional arrangements are
also conceivable. Content producers could give global licenses in
exchange for a share of aggregate revenues flowing to all producers of downstream value. Third parties could subsidize the production of content, as in the business model for television, radio

170 The development of robots that permit one to point to an item on the Web and to

automatically retrieve all related Web items potentially frustrates finer granularity as a
way of increasing a pirate's c.. But, techniques also exist for excluding some or all robots
from Web sites. See Martijn Koster, Robots in the Web: threat or treat?,
httpJ/info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/threat-or-treat.html.
180 See Australian Office of Regulation Review, Economic Analysis Of Copyright
Reform 45 (1995) (describing intellectual property "tie-ins" as means of protection) (cited
in note 25).
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broadcasting, and newspapers. Proprietors of electronic markets,
such as automated help-wanted advertising sections, can buy
content in order to attract customers to their markets.
Technology also permits direct changes in the degree of
excludability and nonrivalness. In Westlaw and CompuServe,
information is excludable because the electronic gateway into the
computers through which information is dispensed does not allow
consumers and potential pirates into the system unless they have
an account. Consumers must pay the bill to maintain their account. The same concept can be deployed in the Web. Particular
items of information may be protected by passwords on certain
Web pages by automating the login process for those particular
pages.
Commentators have proposed a variety of methods for content encryption and copyright management that use technology
not only to make information excludable, but also to make it
rival. One person's use thus defeats the use entitlement of the
predecessor. 181
Technology also can reduce transaction costs for exchanges '
between buyers and sellers of information. For example, VISA
and Mastercard recently published standard documents for credit
card transactions on the Internet. These documents likely will
hasten the deployment and use of payment systems that permit
low-cost exchanges of chunks of information so small that they
are not worthwhile to steal. Thus, the payment-system technology and product design together reduce the relative transaction
costs to payers and increase the acquisition and transformation
costs for nonpayers.
D. The Role of Private Cooperatives
Historically, copyright-licensing collectives have played a
useful role in reducing the transaction costs of disseminating
intellectual property to authorized redistributors'8 2 and in reducing the costs of detecting violations.183 The American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), s' Broadcast
"8' See generally Proceedings: Technological Strategies for Protecting Intellectual
Property in the Networked Multimedia Environment (Interactive Multimedia Association
Intellectual Property Project, 1994) (collecting nineteen papers that describe technological
means for controlling and metering access to information in electronic formats).
182 This decreases cm.
"
This increases c,,.
8
United States v American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 32 F3d
727, 728 (2d Cir 1994) (describing ASCAP's role in collecting fees for broadcast jingles);
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Music, Inc. ("BMI"), 58 and the newer Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC")15 6 have demonstrated their capability in this regard.
Similar institutions can arise in the electronic environment, although they have not done so yet. 87 It is useful to identify the
possible functions and configurations for copyright collectives in

environments like the Web.
1. Detect violations.
An intellectual-property cooperative can assist enforcement
by detecting infringement. The cooperative could monitor advertisements and other promotional efforts by pirates, sample the
virtual places in which infringement is likely,"s and visit places
in which jukeboxes and newer technological means are installed. 89
The cooperative could deploy "sniffers" that would detect bit
patterns suggestive of infringing conduct. For example, if legitimate publishers use a common signature or trademark to signify
authorization to publish copyrighted works, the sniffer could look
for instances of that bit pattern transmitted by unauthorized
servers on a network. Or, in the case of extremely popular works,
the sniffer could look for bit patterns representing unique or
nearly unique parts of the content, transmitted by unauthorized
sources.

Superhype Publishing,Inc. v Vasiliou, 838 F Supp 1220 (SD Ohio 1993) (imposing vicarious liability on restaurant for playing music without license from ASCAP).
" Broadcast Music, Inc. v Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F2d 1482, 1484 (7th Cir
1991) (describing BMI and holding that defendant was not liable for copyright infringement for playing music in stores); InternationalKorwin Corp. v Kowalczyk, 855 F2d 375,
381 n 12 (7th Cir 1988) (describing BMI and comparing it to ASCAP); Broadcast Music,
Inc. v Opticom Inc., 1992 WL 510894 (ED Va) (describing -how BMI investigator recorded
unlicensed broadcasts).
" American Geophysical Union v Texaco, Inc., 60 F3d 913, 929 n 16 (2d Cir 1994) (describing CCC); Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 79
Tax Ct 793, 795 (1982) (describing functions of CCC).
" See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
Colum L Rev 2655, 2662 (1994) (arguing that presence of high transaction costs can
encourage producers and users to invest in institutions that lower the cost of certain types
of exchanges; citing radio broadcasting as historical example) (cited in note 59). See also
Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review
Essay, 93 Mich L Rev 1570 (1995) (arguing for development of integrated commercial-law
doctrine for intellectual property-based transactions).
"'
This is analogous to BMI's monitoring of radio broadcasts.
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v Star Amusements, Inc., 44 F3d 485, 486 (7th Cir 1995)
(describing role of BMI and ASCAP in enforcing copyright with respect to jukebox operators).
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Despite the possibility of such technological detection of
infringement, more attention should be given to practical implementation. For example, a sniffer computer must have the capacity to process all of the packets traversing its network segment.
This means that a sniffer positioned astride a major stream of
Internet commerce, as on a backbone or network access point
("NAP"), 190 must have processing capacity equal to the routers
making up the backbone or NAP service. While a lower-capacity
sniffer could handle all of the packets moving through a particular midlevel network, it would never see potentially infringing
packets moving on other midlevel networks. The cost of a comprehensive infringement-detection system would depend not only
upon the cost of developing and deploying an appropriate pattern-matching algorithm, but also upon the number of backbone
connections or NAPs and the cost of replicating backbone or NAP
processing speed.
2. Standardize licensing terms.
Intellectual property cooperatives can standardize terms for
licensing for common activities such as caching. For example, a
cooperative could extend an offer to all Web intermediaries that,
in exchange for the payment of a fixed and modest amount, it
would authorize the intermediaries to engage in a defined type of
caching as to all the intellectual property represented by the
cooperative. Then, the placement of a work on a Web server by a
content originator represented through the cooperative implies
(or expressly gives) authorization to engage in the defined caching. In addition, it provides a low-cost and low-risk way for intermediaries to reduce the risk of infringement liability.
3. Simplify pricing.
Cooperatives can simplify pricing for the use of represented
works. Much as film libraries make it easier for republishers and
creators of derivative works to access existing film footage, an
electronic intellectual-property cooperative could organize pointers to represented works and offer standard pricing arrangements for persons wishing to redisseminate or adapt those works.

As the Internet has become commercialized, the concept has shifted from a hierarchical network model, in which midlevel networks are connected to each other through
one or more backbones, to a model in which midlevel networks connect directly to other
midlevel networks through NAPs. See National Science Foundation RFP.
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4. Provide certificate-authorityservices.
One of the prerequisites to an effective public-key encryption
system is the availability of public keys for all participants. Under RFC19 ' 1122, "certificate authorities" ("CAs") associate participant names with their public keys in a way that reduces or
eliminates the potential for spoofing and impersonation.19 A
copyright cooperative could function as a CA for content owners
who encrypt either their content or their header information that
identifies licensing terms.
Intellectual-property cooperatives could expand beyond the
provision of public-key encryption CA services into a broader
range of electronic payment system services. Most proposals for
electronic payment systems rely on some form of public-key encryption, and it is logical for the CA to provide payment authorization services similar to those performed by credit card authorization services.193
E. Law's Role
The best solution for legal protection is to leave present law
alone. The White Paper does not make the case for establishing a
new transmission right, and no justification exists for American
adoption of database protection measures like those recommended by the European Commission. There is every reason to believe
that the product design, business method, and technological
protections addressed in Part IV.C will increase ca and c, so as to
leave present levels of cl adequate to protect originator investment. Congress should reject the recommendations of the White
Paper and leave the present copyright statute intact.
A healthy information infrastructure undoubtedly requires
adequate legal protection for the intellectual property of content
creators. While extending the scope of copyright protection, as
recommended in the White Paper,might maximize the position of
existing intellectual-property owners, such extension would not
necessarily optimize the production and use of information. The
extension of protection for existing intellectual property represents a barrier and a cost to creators of new intellectual property.

"' An RFC is a statement of a technical standard for the Internet. RFCs are developed by the IETF.
192 S. Kent, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-

Based Key Management: RFC 1422 (Network Working Group, 1993).
"' See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructuresfor Electronic
Payment Systems, 22:1 Rutgers Computer and Technology L J 1 (1996).
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At any point on a continuum of intellectual-property protection,
some creators will always find adequate incentive and acceptable
risk of piracy and therefore will create and produce, while others
will find the risks too great or the rewards too small. Thus, at
almost any conceivable scope of copyright and other statutory
protection, some level of electronic publishing and Internet-like
environments will exist. Some potential authors and publishers,
however, will always claim that they will only add to the store of
electronic information if the law is changed. Congress should not
change sound policy and sound law merely because some potential contributors testify that the status quo frightens them. Rather, Congress should scrutinize the empirical evidence of actual
and withheld resources and seek to discover links between conduct and the state of the law. A single maximum for social welfare does not, and will never, exist. Rather, an evolving boundary
between the protected and the unprotectable will exist, shaped by
a political equilibrium among competing economic interests.
It is reasonably clear, however, that something more or less
like today's copyright, trade secret, trademark, and contract
protections should continue to operate. These legal entitlements
protect content originators from gross piracy.
New business and pricing models, supplemented by electronic payment systems, are likely to be adequate to stimulate development of rich content in the Global Information Infrastructure
(GII). These methods are far less likely to stunt development of
the crucial intermediary function in the GII than the White
Paper'srecommendations.
If the law is changed, statutory protection for intermediaries,
especially for caching, should be added. The possibility of primary
or contributory copyright-infringement claims against Internet
intermediaries may result in a kind of de facto prior restraint
that interferes with a lively information marketplace in open
network architectures. Statutory protection for intermediaries
may be an appropriate piece of a comprehensive statutory approach to intellectual property in the NII, notwithstanding the
difficulty of defining the types of caching that deserve protection.
Both a safe harbor for caching and stronger protections against
ex parte seizure orders may be appropriate.
Just as the case has not been made for amending the Copyright Act to extend protection for copyright owners, neither does
the case law cry out for new statutory protections for intermediaries. Only two cases actually imposed no-fault liability on intermediaries, and their factual situations suggested that the inter-
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mediaries deserved liability, even though fault may not have
been provable. The different legal position of traditional online
service providers who maintain their own content and do their
own copying and distribution in response to consumer requests,
compared with Web servers, may create a healthy migration
away from older technologies to newer ones like the Web. This
migration would unbundle the intermediary function from the
content-originator function, and thus perhaps make it easier to
target indemnification and other practical arrangements that
protect pure intermediaries. As the White Paper states, content
servers may be indemnified by their customers who place content
on them.
On the other hand, if Congress amends the Copyright Act to
adopt the suggestions expressed in the White Paper, it certainly
also should amend the Copyright Act to recognize the
intermediaries' needs for safe harbors. Communications law,
written into the Copyright Act, offers a useful model for such
statutory protection. The Copyright Act deals with the special
position of intermediaries in its provisions concerning specialized
privileges for broadcast intermediaries. For example, section
111(a)(3) provides that copyright infringement does not occur if a
secondary transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work is made by:
any carrier who has no direct or indirect control over
the content or selection of the primary transmission or
over the particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose activities with respect to the secondary
transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or
other4 communications channels for the use of oth9
ers. 1
The legislative history notes that Congress intended section
111(a)(2) to grant a privilege to "passive carriers." 95 Section
111(a)(1) provides a similar privilege for secondary transmissions
to parts of a hotel, apartment house, or similar establishment,
but only so long as no alterations are made.'96
Intermediaries in the NII play a somewhat different role
from transmission facilities in broadcast media. Intermediary
protection must recognize a system operator's selection of class-

17 USC § 111(a)(3) (1994).
,9 See HR Rep No 94-1476, following 17 USC § l1 (1994).
'1 17 USC § 111(a)(1) (1994).
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es of communications to conform to its entrepreneurial definition
of its product or service niche. It also must recognize the appropriateness of certain transformations and alterations that occur
as part of normal digital processing. One could adapt the language of section 111 to the position of other kinds of intermediaries in the NII in the following way:
[F]orwarding or transferring a work infringing the copyright of another does not itself constitute. copyright infringement if the forwarding or transferring is made or
facilitated by an electronic service provider who has no
direct or indirect control over the content of the infringing work and whose activities with respect to the forwarding consist solely of providing communications
channels, pointers, and intermediate copying at the
request of another or for the use of others. This exemption shall not extend to sponsoring, soliciting, promoting, or adopting infringement as the provider's own.
Even if Congress does not grant more general immunity for
intermediaries, caching represents a particularly compelling case
for a safe harbor. In all three examples given in Part III, it seems
appropriate to classify the caching as consistent with the assumed restrictions on use of the content. In other words, the
described caching should not be considered illegal copying. Courts
can avoid infringement for caching by defining certain types of
caching as fair use or by concluding that an implied license to
cache exists.
However, such privileged caching is difficult to define. Limiting the privilege to ephemeral copies would be too narrow because of the way Netscape caches to disk and preserves cached
files after a Netscape session is terminated. Extending the privilege to copies made to facilitate future retrieval might be too
broad because such a privilege could frustrate a content supplier's legitimate interest in restricting secondary copying. For
example, the provider in the third example offered in Part III
might allow its customers to obtain material from its host without paying for access to the material from CS. Or, C might pay
once for an access to CS, but then obtain another copy from the
cached version on the provider's host and make prohibited copies of that second cached copy. C could argue that the restrictions
applicable to the original accessed material do not apply to material accessed from the provider's host. It might be appropriate to
condition the privilege on not using the cached version to inten-
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tionally or foreseeably frustrate the restrictions imposed by the
content supplier with respect to third parties. While Congress
could specify the details of a caching privilege in a statute, it
would be better to work them out through a private cooperative
licensing scheme as suggested in Part V.B.
Coasian analysis suggests that it may not matter whether
intermediaries face liability if theycan bargain to shift the liability elsewhere. The White Paper assumes that intermediaries can
shift the liability. Calabresi and Melamed offer five considerations for placing entitlements:
(1) that economic efficiency standing alone would dictate that set of entitlements which favors knowledgeable choices between social benefits and the social costs
of obtaining them, and between social costs and the
social costs of avoiding them; (2) that this implies, in
the absence of certainty as to whether a benefit is worth
its costs to society, that the cost should be put on the
party or activity best located to make such a cost-benefit analysis; (3) that in particular contexts like accidents
or pollution this suggests putting costs on the party or
activity which can most cheaply avoid them; (4) that in
the absence of certainty as to who that party or activity
is, the costs should be put on the party or activity which
can with the lowest transaction cost ... correct an error
in entitlements by inducing the party who can avoid
social costs most cheaply to do so; and (5) that since we
are in an area where by hypothesis markets do not
work perfectly-there are transaction costs-a decision
will often have to be made on whether market transactions or collective fiat is most likely to bring us closer to
the pareto optimal result."' 7
The fourth criterion is particularly significant. Who has the
lowest transaction cost in negotiating a shift in liability?198 The
originator's intermediary faces relatively low transaction costs
for negotiations with the originator because the intermediary
either acquires the originator's content and places it on his own
server, or establishes pointers to the originator's server. These
transaction costs may be high or low relative to the value of the

"
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1097-98 (cited in note 7).
198 Figure 3 introduces the entities discussed in the following paragraphs.
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content, but they are surely lower than anyone else's vis-a-vis
the originator. The consumer faces the lowest transaction costs
for negotiations with the consumer's intermediary. The consumer has an account with the consumer's intermediary, or at least
the consumer's intermediary has an opportunity to exclude the
consumer-based on the consumer's IP address. 9
The pure intermediary faces the highest transaction costs for
negotiations with either originator or consumer. The intermediary does not know who the originator or consumer is, and cannot
know in advance of a request from a particular consumer for a
particular piece of content traversing the pure intermediary's
server. The originator and consumer also face relatively high
transaction costs with respect to negotiations with each other
because neither knows who the other is in advance and neither
may have the opportunity to know because the transaction occurs
through a series of intermediaries. Thus, it should not make any
difference whether one grants an entitlement to an originator or
an originator's intermediary because they can negotiate a reallocation of responsibility between them. Similarly, it should not
matter whether one imposes a duty on the consumer or the consumer's intermediary because they likewise can negotiate a
reallocation. The problems exist with respect to reallocation between the originator end and the consumer end. The validity of
the White Paper's conclusion depends upon the pure intermediary having lower transaction costs for negotiating than either the
originator and its intermediary or the consumer and its intermediary. A pure intermediary could have lower transaction costs
only if its size were such that it would have greater knowledge
than originators, consumers, or both.2 °0
This leaves the question of whether property or liability rules
are most appropriate. Professor Hardy's article suggests that
new information technologies reduce transaction costs, and therefore a shift to property rules may be appropriate.2 °1 This suggests less reliance on trade secret and more reliance on copyright, patent, and trademark. It also suggests less reliance on
contract, as with Westlaw or America Online.2 2 One could

199

But this is not unique because, given the way the Web works, any server knows

who the consumer is and has the same opportunity to exclude a request from that IP
address. So the consumer's intermediary may not be special after all.
20 Lack of knowledge is a transaction cost in the Coasian framework.
2o1 Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U Chi Legal F 217,
219 (cited in note 8).
202 Licensing is a liability-based approach because it relies on contract law, and the
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argue that what matters is not the absolute level of transaction
costs, which probably decreases with new information technology,
but the relative level of transaction costs, given the value of items
of information to be exchanged. Thus if new uses of information
technology decrease the value of the items to be exchanged, as
they may when granularity becomes finer, then a shift in favor of
property rules would be appropriate only if transaction costs
decrease faster.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties, encryption
plays a role in protecting intellectual property. Some content
originators will prefer technological protection through content
encryption and/or encryption systems associated with payment
systems and license and registration authentication schemes,
considered more fully in Part V.C., licensing cooperatives can use
encryption to authenticate intellectual-property permissions and
to limit certain intellectual-property publishing to members of
the cooperative. Such encryption systems also can facilitate detection of violations and thus make legal protections more enforceable. More important, encryption can be used for authentication in electronic payment systems.
Acceptable payment systems require encryption to assure the
privacy of information such as credit card numbers and to protect
sellers against forgery. Public-key encryption (also known as
asymmetric-key encryption) seems to be the most appropriate
tool with which to build payment systems. Private-key encryption
produces as good or better security and authentication with better performance. However, private-key encryption is poorly suited
to open systems like the Internet, where sellers and buyers want
to do business with each other without having any prior relationship. If private keys had to be exchanged before single-key encryption transactions, a prior relationship would be necessary.

traditional remedies for breach of contract are damages rather than injunctions. Property
rules are enforceable by injunction and thus require negotiation in advance of transfer.
Liability rules allow a government institution such as a court to determine the value after
the interest has been transferred. Calabresi and Melamed offer a picturesque illustration:
"If we were to give victims a property entitlement not to be accidentally injured we would
have to require all who engage in activities that may injure individuals to negotiate with
them before an accident, and to buy the right to knock off an arm or a leg." Calabresi &
Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1108 (cited in note 7). See Merges, 93 Mich L Rev at 1574
(cited in note 188) ("The most obvious illustration of how property rights confer tight
control is . . . the availability of quick injunctions in the event of breach."). Professor
Merges argues that it is difficult for contract terms to substitute fully for the enhanced
control conferred by the availability of injunctions for infringements of intellectual property. Id at 1574-75.

320

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1996:

Encryption does not solve the problem, however, without the
technological and legal infrastructure to support encryption in
open network environments. Two encryption applications are of
interest: making content unavailable to those without a key, and
authentication and binding. Making content unavailable involves
the same applications used to ensure message privacy. Authentication and binding involve digital-signature functions. Public-key
encryption serves both privacy and digital signature functions. It
uses two different keys for the same message, one of which can
be made available to the public generally, and the other kept
secret. To ensure privacy-or unavailability of content-the sender uses the recipient's public key to encrypt the message, which
then becomes inaccessible to anyone lacking the corresponding
private key-which only the recipient has. If a particular customer does not pay, the sender would not encrypt with that customer's public key. To verify that a message came from a particular source, and to detect any tampering with the parts of the
file or message, the sender uses her secret key to sign a "digest"
of the message. Anyone with that sender's public key can
decrypt the message, but that public key will decrypt only digests
coming from that sender. The same privacy and digital signature
functions also make secure payment systems possible in open
network architectures.
Widespread use of public-key encryption to protect intellectual property requires an infrastructure for key management. In
order for public-key encryption to work in large open systems,
there must be places from which public keys can be obtained and
associated with the person or entity with whom one wants to do
business. Most approaches to public-key encryption envision one
or more public-key CAs that would maintain databases, somewhat like conventional telephone directories, that associate each
potential sender with her public key. Though the CA could be
corrupted, for example, by a crook masquerading as a credit card
company to confirm a credit card order, it would become harder
as more CAs develop. The more independent entities that must
be corrupted, the greater the challenge for someone who wants to
compromise security. Thus, by adding more independent verification institutions, one increases security even if no single entity is
completely trustworthy.
Technological and legal questions associated with the keycertification process form the core of the infrastructure questions
with respect to public-key encryption. The Internet community
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has already addressed the technical issues, °3 but the legal issues still must be resolved.
Utah recently enacted the first statute governing digital
signatures. 2' 4 The Utah digital-signature statute establishes an
authentication hierarchy that conforms to the authentication
hierarchy of RFC 1422. The statute also establishes an administrative agency to regulate the authentication of computer-based
documents.2 5
The Utah statute makes a digitally signed document as valid
as if it had been written on paper,0 6 except for "a negotiable
instrument payable to bearer" or financial-institution transactions. 27 The statute establishes presumptions for certificates
issued by licensed CAs and excludes certificates issued by unlicensed CAs. The statute presumes that a certificate is an acknowledgment of a digital signature, that a digital signature
verified with a public key is affixed with the intention of the
subscriber to authenticate the message and to be bound by its
contents, and that a time-stamped digital signature is prima
facie evidence that the signature took effect as of the date and
time indicated. The presumption in favor of a digital signature's
validity may be rebutted only under defined situations.0 8
20

Kent, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail (cited in note 193) (defin-

ing architecture and infrastructure for authentication system based on public-key encryption techniques).
204 Utah Digital Signatures Act, 1995 Utah Laws Ch 61. The Utah Digital Signature
Legislative Facilitation Committee drafted the digital-signature statute to support several
standards, including X.509 and RFC 1422. Utah Code Ann § 46-3-102(4) (1995) (referring
to "Standard X.509 of the International Telecommunication Union (formerly CCITT or
International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee), ... Standard X.9.30 of
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and ... RFC 1421 through 1424 of
the Internet Activities Board (IAB)"). Utah's statute is optional in two respects: it makes
registration of CAs optional; and it allows trading partners to use paper or to make any
other form of payment arrangements they wish. Utah Code Ann § 46-3-201; id, § 46-3-402.
20" This agency would be analogous to a Policy Certification Authority ("PCA") in RFC
1422. A PCA establishes and publishes policies for registering CAs and subscribers. For
the Internet community, PCAs publish their policies in the form of informational RFCs.
00 Utah Code Ann § 46-3-402 (1995).
20' Id § 46-3-403.
20 Section 46-3-401(5) provides that the presumption may be rebutted:
(a) by evidence indicating that a digital signature cannot be verified by reference
to a certificate issued by a licensed certification authority;
(b) by evidence that the rightful holder of the private key by which the digital
signature was affixed had lost exclusive control of the private key, without violating any duty imposed by this chapter, at the time when the digital signature
was affixed;
(c) by evidence showing a lack of a signature at common law; or
(d) by a showing that reliance on the presumption was not commercially reason-
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The Utah statute goes further than RFC 1422 in allocating
the risk of a CA mistake. CAs that wish to be licensed in Utah
must post a bond, and their liability in the event of a mistaken
certification is limited to the amount of the bond. Other limitations on liability may be specified in special fields of CA records.2" The CAs have a duty to avoid conducting business so
as to create a commercially unreasonable risk of loss to subscribers and persons relying on certificates.2 0 The division enforces
this and other duties, and it may seek injunctions and authorize
private actions for violation of division orders.2 '
Subscribers that accept certificates from licensed CAs certify
"to all who justifiably rely on the information contained in the
certificate that... each digital signature affixed by means of the
private key corresponding to the public key listed in the certificate is a legally valid signature of the subscriber, . . . [that] no
unauthorized person has access to the private key," and that the
information contained in the certificate is true.1 2 Such subscribers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in retaining
control of their private keys and keeping them confidential.2 13
Other jurisdictions should adopt measures like the Utah
statute. In addition, appiications must be developed that adapt
public-key encryption to the particular needs of copyright owners
and users. Standards for representing copyright information and
for enforcing technological limitations on certain uses must be
developed and accepted in the marketplace. No signs exist yet of
any such widespread acceptance, and this limits the efficacy of
encryption as a solution to intellectual-property concerns.
For encryption to become a significant part of the framework
for protecting intellectual property, the law may need to impose
duties not to compromise encryption. The White Paper proposes
statutory language that would make it illegal to frustrate encryption and other copyright-management systems.2 14

able under the circumstances.
Id § 46-3-401(5).
"'
Id § 46-3-308 (establishing the effect of reliance limit; limitations on CA liability).
230 Utah Code Ann § 46-3-207 (1995).
21 Id § 46-3-204.
2M2Id § 46-3-302.
213

Id § 46-3-303.

214 See White Paper, Appendix 2, § 1201 (cited in note 5) (concerning circumvention of

copyright-protection systems); id § 1202 (prohibiting false copyright information and removal of copyright-management information). There is precedent for this proposed legal
duty not to compromise encryption schemes in the digital audio legislation. The passage
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VI. FUTURE OF OPEN SYSTEMS

The risks of piracy may make content originators reluctant
to publish their most valuable content in Internet-like architectures. In addition, the risks of no-fault liability may make intermediaries reluctant to handle valuable intellectual property in
open architectures. The combination of these two forces may

solve the intellectual-property protection problem by perpetuating
arrangements that seem host-based, even though they are implemented in the World Wide Web or similar open network architectures.
The desire for certain features of closed systems does not
doom the Internet model for the NII, however. For one thing,
even if privately generated content is published only in relatively
closed subparts of an overall open network architecture, the
Internet and similar open network architectures will not die. Important parts of the world's information resources do not involve
privately generated content. Public information is an obvious example. Intellectual-property protection is statutorily unavailable
for federal-agency information, and should be unavailable for
state and local public information.2 1 The unavailability of copyright protection for public information may, on the one hand, encourage the deployment of closed systems to enhance the return
to organizers of such information. However, an appropriate public
commitment to make basic content available through the
Internet on a nonexclusive basis, as required by the Paperwork

below compares the language of White Paper § 1201 with 17 USC § 1002(c)(1994), relating
to digital audio recordings. Underlining indicates language in § 1201 not in § 1002(c);
brackets indicate language in § 1002(c) not in § 1201:
1201. Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
No person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product, or component incorporatedinto a device or product, or offer or perform any service, the
primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law,
any [program or circuit which implements in whole or in part, a system described in subsection (a)]process, treatment, mechanism or system which prevents
or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under section 106.
21

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Government Information, 4

Wm & Mary Bill of Rights J 179 (1995) (cited in note 6) (marshalling legal arguments
against copyright and copyright-like protection for public information); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Should Local Governments Sell Local Spatial Databases Through State Monopolies?,
35 Jurimet J 449 (1995) (cited in note 6); Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government
Copyright an Copyright-Like Controls over Public Intermediaries, 45 Syracuse L Rev 999
(1995) (cited in note 6).
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Reduction Act of 1995,16 should ensure against the locking up
of public information and proprietary preserves. In addition,
factual data are ineligible for copyright protection under Feist v
Rural Telephone Co.,"7 but publishers have an economic interest in making such data available. Job-bank information is an
obvious example." 8
Moreover, as the NII matures, the advantages of closed networks for protecting intellectual property and discouraging tortious and criminal content will lead to a merger of the open and
closed architectures. While some role may remain for the original
closed networks, like pre-1993 CompuServe, America Online,
Westlaw, and Lexis, new Internet technologies likely will permit
certain features of those approaches to exist alongside traditional
open architectures in the Internet. For example, new tools are
being developed to screen and block pornography in order to
stave off federal legislation like the Exon amendment,"' and
they can be used to exclude persons who violate community
rules. These tools would enable an Internet-based community to
unplug someone, just as CompuServe or America Online may do
now by canceling an account and password. Secure payment
systems will supplement expulsion. These systems will deny
access to certain Internet resources until appropriate payment
arrangements have been made. This is possible now with a combination of Netscape CGI-bin scripts and public-key encryption.
Access can be denied to a particular set of Web pages or
newsgroups unless one has an account name and password associated with that particular set of resources. Public-key encryption
permits private transmission of credit card numbers and authentication of an account holder's identity.
Suppliers of intellectual property will be drawn away from
completely autonomous closed systems because of the flexibility
of Internet-based tools like the Web and Netscape. In addition,
the much larger potential market available through the Internet,
compared to independent services that must convince people to
subscribe, will attract supplies to public-key encryption as well.

216

Pub L No 104-13, 109 Stat 163 (1995), codified at 44 USC §§ 3501-3520 (1995).

217

499 US 340, 345 (1991).

218

See Ink Plus Internet: Your 21st Century Recruiting Solution, Int'l Herald Trib 6

(Aug 15, 1995) (advertisement for job marketplace for persons with advanced degrees at
http'//chronicle.merit.edu, or Gopher to: chronicle.merit.edu). For further information,
contact Ink Plus at chronicle.com.
219 S 314, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 1, 1995).
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VII. FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK

First Amendment analysis is an important missing ingredient in the intermediary copyright-infringement cases. It is generally accepted that the fair-use defense internalizes First Amendment considerations into copyright law. 22' However, courts that
impose no-fault liability for copyright infringement on intermediaries 22' fail to consider the First Amendment at all. When
courts impose no-fault liability on intermediaries for the information that they carry, the intermediaries are discouraged from
certain activities. This results in a kind of de facto prior restraint.222
The First Amendment traditionally has been hostile to prior
restraints, including governmental bans on publication before it
occurs.22 Surprisingly, the constitutional preference for avoiding prior restraints does not operate when intellectual property is
involved. "[N]o one denies that a newspaper can properly 22be4
enjoined from publishing the copyrighted works of another."
The district court opinion in New Era PublicationsInternational
v Henry Holt & Co.225 is an exception. In New Era Publications,

a Church of Scientology affiliate brought suit to enjoin publication of a critical biography of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the
Church of Scientology, on the ground that the biography infringed copyright. The district court found some infringement
outside the scope of fair use, but nevertheless denied an injunction on First Amendment grounds. "[Clourts should weigh cautiously whether a prior restraint in the form of an injunction is
the appropriate remedy."22' The court also suggested that "[i]n

determining questions of fair use and of remedy, [courts should
consider] whether a copyright action is brought in good faith to
preserve the benefits secured by the copyright law or whether it
is brought to accomplish a different purpose, such as combatting
220 Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v Nation Enterprises,471 US 539, 549 (1985).

See Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v Frena, 839 F Supp 1552 (MD Fla 1993).
See Cubby, Inc. v CompuServe, Inc., 776 F Supp 135, 139-40 (SD NY 1991) (stating
that chilling effect of no-fault liability imposed on intermediaries leads to First Amendment limitations on standards for defamation liability for electronic-information intermediary). The same chilling effect occurs regardless of whether no-fault liability is imposed
for defamatory messages or for intellectual-property infringement.
2
See New York Times Co. v United States, 403 US 713 (1971) (holding that enjoining
publication of "Pentagon Papers" was impermissible prior restraint).
224 Id at 731 n 1 (White concurring).
695 F Supp 1493 (SD NY 1988), affd, 873 F2d 576 (2d Cir 1989) (disagreeing
with district court reasoning on First Amendment).
226 695 F Supp at 1527.
"'
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a hostile or derogatory publication."22 7 More generally, the district judge noted that section 512 of the Copyright Act does not
require courts to grant injunctive relief, and that "[w]e must,
therefore, focus with new intensity on the potential conflict between the copyright and freedom of speech, and particularly on
the question whether a finding of infringement should ritualistically call forth an injunction."2 28
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of an injunction, but
only on laches grounds. They disagreed with much of the district
court's analysis, stating, "We are not persuaded, however, that
any [F]irst [A]mendment concerns not accommodated by the
Copyright Act are implicated in this action. Our observation that
the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of [F]irst
[A]mendment in the copyright field... never has been repudiated."229 Chief Judge Oakes concurred, expressing greater support for the district court's analysis.2 30 Oakes recognized the
strong authority against separate consideration of First Amendment matters in a copyright injunction, but nevertheless stated
that judges have discretion to grant an injunction in a copyright
case.23 1 The matter did not rest there because the dissent from
the denial of a rehearing en banc232 urged that the panel majority opinion should not be understood as saying that injunctive
relief follows as a matter of course once copyright infringement
has been found. Rather, equitable discretion should determine
the propriety of an injunction.2 3
A minority of the Supreme Court recognized that contractual
restrictions also may offend the First Amendment by imposing de
facto prior restraint, albeit in a case in which the United States
government was a party to the contract. 234 The dissent thus

227 Id at 1527 n 14.
228

Id at 1526 (characterizing 17 USC § 502 (1994)). A New York trial court also used

an approach similar to that used by the district in New EraPublications.See Rosemont Enterprises,Inc. v McGraw-Hill Book Co., 380 NYS2d 839, 843 (Sup Ct 1975) (denying injunction against allegedly infringing autobiography because injunction against publication
would violate First Amendment).
229 New Era PublicationsIntl v Henry Holt & Co., 873 F2d 576, 584 (2nd Cir 1989).
230 Id at 585 (Oakes concurring).
231 Id at 596 (acknowledging that "[n]o Circuit that has considered the question...

has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine").
2.2 New Era PublicationsInt'l v Henry Holt & Co., 884 F2d 659, 662 (2d Cir 1989) (on
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc).
2
Id at 663-64.
21 Snepp v United States, 444 US 507, 516, 520 (1980) (Stevens dissent from majority

holding that CIA agent who published memoirs in violation of CIA contract was subject to
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supports the idea of a de facto prior restraint, but does not extend the concern into purely private activities.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia recently ordered the seizure of the computer hardware
and files of an Internet publisher who made copyrighted Church
of Scientology text available.235 In another case, the District
Court of Colorado issued an ex parte temporary restraining order
("TRO") and a seizure order, resulting in the seizure of computer
equipment and software used by an Internet bulletin board.2"6
Twenty-one days later, the District Court denied a preliminary
injunction, vacated most of the TRO, and ordered the return of
the seized materials, commenting:
[S]uch relief [the requested injunction] would effectively
pull the plug on Defendants' electronic library, infringe
not only on their rights of criticism and research but be
the death knell of FACTNET.... The injunction sought

would silence the Defendants as participants in an
ongoing debate involving matters of significant public
controversy. Relief of this kind does not serve the public
interest.237
Commentators agree that First Amendment and copyright
interests should be balanced more explicitly. The law-review
literature almost uniformly urges more attention to the First
Amendment in copyright-injunction cases.23s This pressure from

constructive trust for all profits he made).
Religious Technology Center v Lerma, 897 F Supp 260 (ED Va 1995) (describing
earlier temporary restraining order, order for impoundment, and writ of seizure directed
at hardware for posting material on the Internet, but holding that First Amendment
prevented injunction against the Washington Post).
230 Religious Technology Center v F.AC.T.Net, Inc., 901 F Supp 1519 (D Colo 1995).
2 Id at 1527. The district court in Religious Technologies Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communications Services, Inc., 907 F Supp 1361 (NDCal 1995) appropriately considered
First Amendment interests in rejecting no-fault liability for copyright infringement.
' See Wendy J. Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self Expression:Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L J 1533, 1537 (1993) (cited in
note 40) (noting that "legions of commentators have deplored" the tendency of courts to
ignore First Amendment privileges when copyright or trademark suits are brought, but
"the courts have too often turned a deaf ear to these arguments. The incantation 'property' seems sufficient to render free speech issues invisible."). See also Jessica Litman,
Copyright and Information Policy, 55 L & Contemp Probs 185, 204 (1992) (questioning
conventional wisdom that First Amendment need not be considered separately in copyright cases); Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes
and Variations, 55 L & Contemp Probs 45 (1992) (surveying injunctive and damages
remedies for intellectual-property invasion, and observing that injunction for copyright infringement is virtually automatic, despite plausible First Amendment concerns). See also
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the literature likely will have some affect on the courts as copyright is used more aggressively to blunt NII activities.
Judicial willingness to grant injunctions is ironic, considering
copyright's origins as a government-censorship tool.2 9 "Having
a doctrine in free speech law that severely limits the use of prior
restraints, only to throw it all out whenever even a small amount
of someone else's expression has been incorporated into the
24
defendant's speech makes no sense.""
Regardless of whether the copyright statute is involved, the
courts should rediscover the First Amendment, follow the advice
of commentators and the district court in New Era Publications,
and recognize that copyright can be used to chill the kind of
expression the First Amendment intends to shield. In particular,
if intermediaries must censor unpopular views to avoid no-fault
copyright liability, as some of the Church of Scientology cases
suggest, First Amendment analysis should be used to apply fair
use and ameliorate no-fault infringement-liability concepts.
Moreover, when ex parte seizure occurs, the victims should
be able to object to the interference with their interests in an
action on the bond under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") and also in an action for damages under 42
USC section 1983. Persons who wrongfully obtain injunctive
relief or otherwise use legal processes to interfere with another's
property interests are subject to four kinds of sanctions: 1) damages against the bond required to be posted for interlocutory
injunctive relief under FRCP 65; 2) damages for violation of civil
rights under 42 USC section 1983;241 3) sanctions under special-

Comment, Bare-FacedMess: Fair Use and the First Amendment, 70 Or L Rev 211 (1991)
(urging evolution of fair-use doctrine to give First Amendment considerations more
emphasis); Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment,
89 Colum L Rev 1940 (1989) (suggesting revised fair-use formula to accommodate First
Amendment concerns better, including greater reliance on damages).
23 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 665, 677 (1992)
(reviewing history of British copyright law and role of prior restraints not abolished until
1694).
240 Id at 737-738 (noting that if primary justification for protecting intellectualproperty interest is economic, compensatory damages should be primary form of remedy).
24' However, the victim of an ex parte seizure may have problems establishing state
action. See Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158 (1992) (holding that qualified immunity not available to private defendants in section 1983 actions for invoking state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statutes; remanding for determination whether state action was
involved); Jordan v Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 787 F Supp 471, 475-76, 480 (ED
Pa 1992) (holding that attorneys executing confessed judgment were state actors and thus
subject to liability under 42 USC § 1983, but also wefe entitled to qualified immunity as
public officers). Most of the cases under section 1983 involve replevin or attachment, but
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ized statutory provisions like that protecting against wrongful
Lanham Act seizures;2 42 and 4) common-law actions for abuse of
process. 2" Presently, however, the FRCP 65 solution often is
not worth much,2 " because the bonds are set very low, 2" and
the bond sets a ceiling on the amount that can be recovered by
those wrongfully enjoined.2"

VIII. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The information superhighway is inherently international.
Internet activities rarely respect national boundaries.24 7 A message sent from California goes as easily to an addressee in Israel
as to one in California or Massachusetts. A client machine in
Virginia can retrieve an infringing work located on a server in
Sweden as easily as a client machine in Israel. Internet-like
technologies usually permit the location of files and messages to
be determined, and thus permit the location of an infringing
activity to be located with reasonable certainty. 2" However, detecting a violation in another country is not the same thing as
realizing intellectual-property rights in an economic sense. Personal jurisdiction over the infringer still must be obtained, and a
judgment or an injunction still must be enforced.
An effective property regime for the information infrastructure requires the development of appropriate doctrines to represent the balance between private ownership and public exploitathe same reasoning applies to injunctions that affect interference with property interests.
242 15 USC § 1116(d)(11) (1994). See Electronic Laboratory Supply Co., Inc. v Cullen,
977 F2d 798, 804 (3d Cir 1992) (holding that attorney is not subject to sanctions under
Lanham Act for wrongful ex parte seizure).
243 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1965); Wyatt, 504 US
164 (discussing
common-law malicious prosecution and abuse-of-process actions).
24 But see qad. inc. v ALN Associates, 781 F Supp 561, 562 (ND Ill 1992) (holding
that bad-faith preliminary injunction in copyright case warranted increasing bond).
245 See Religious Technology Center v F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F Supp 1519 (D Colo 1995)
($10,000 bond); Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication Services,
Inc., 907 F Supp 1361 (ND Cal 1995) ($25,000 bond); First Technology Safety Systems, Inc.
v Depinent, 11 F3d 641 (6th Cir 1993) (setting $2,000 bond for seizure of allegedly infringing articles rather than $2.2 million requested by owner of seized articles).
24' But see qad. inc., 781 F Supp at 562 (holding that bad-faith preliminary injunction
in copyright case warranted increasing bond).
242 See Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 Intl Law 99, 101 (1995) (attacking widely accepted
proposition that intellectual property is territorial).
2" Anonynous remailers are an exception to this general rule. Remailers are computers that strip electronic messages of all data identifying the sender and then deliver the
messages wherever the sender wants. See Douglass Lavin, As Regulators Seek to Police
Internet, an Offbeat Finnish Service Fights Back, Wall Street J (July 17, 1995).
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tion of information. It also requires the development of international institutional arrangements that harmonize intellectualproperty concepts249 and facilitate transnational enforcement." 0
Recognition of the validity of the international character of
markets for information and computer works stimulated efforts
to append the Trade Related Intellectual Property ('TRIP") provisions to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") negotiations."' TRIP largely incorporates
the Berne Convention, which the United States signed in
1988."2 The basic approach to copyright protection is to require
"national treatment" to ban discrimination against foreign
works," and to set minimum standards for protection
Even if the principles expressed in TRIP are faithfully implemented around the world, however, additional work on adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms is needed. Private international arbitration represents an attractive immediate means of
simplifying choice of law and enforcement problems, inasmuch as
the parties to an arbitration agreement can specify the law to be
applied by the arbitrator. Most major trading partners have
signed the international convention on the enforcement of international arbitration awards.2 "
An intellectual-property cooperative can play a useful role in
developing a model arbitration agreement for handling transna249

See Geller, 29 Intl Law at 110-113 (suggesting that dispute-resolution panels

established under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") might
have the power to fill substantive gaps in protection) (cited in note 247).
' The White Paper responds modestly to this need by proposing an amendment to 17
USC § 602 to include transmission in the definition of importation. United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure:Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights Appendix 1 § 2(c) at 98 (Sept 1995) ("White Paper") (cited in note 5). The White
Papernotes that "[b]ecause copyright laws are territorial, and the standards of protection
embodied in the international conventions leave room for national legislative determinations, acts that may constitute infringement in one country may not be an infringement in
another country." Id at 118.
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual PropertyRights, 33 ILM 81 (1994).
252 J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standardsof Intellectual Property Protection
Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 Intl Law 345, 370 (1995) (TRIP
adopts a "Berne plus" approach); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub L
No 100-568, 102 Stat 2853 (1988).
25. See Creative Technology, Ltd. v Aztech System PTE, Ltd., 61 F3d 696, 700-701 (9th
Cir 1995) (describing national treatment and dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds
copyright-infringement suit brought by Singapore plaintiff).
2' 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention").
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tional intellectual-property problems in the information infrastructure. In the long run, such cooperatives also can be forums
within which other private international-law initiatives can be
crystallized.
CONCLUSION

New information technologies disrupt historic balances between the competing interests involved in intellectual property.
However, owners of intellectual property should not be granted
enlarged economic protection merely because they would like it.
Protecting intellectual property in a flourishing NII depends
more on the imagination of entrepreneurs in designing and deploying new business and pricing models, and depends less on
legal creativity.
The Administration's White Paper does not make a strong
case for amending the copyright law. A preliminary analysis of
the relative costs of originators and pirates in new electronicpublishing environments such as the World Wide Web suggests
that new product design, new business methods, and new technology protections can more than make up for increased risks of
piracy due to reduced copying costs. Congress should reject the
recommendations of the White Paper and leave the present copyright statute intact. On the other hand, if the statute is amended,
statutory protection for intermediaries may be appropriate. A
safe harbor for caching and stronger protections against ex parte
seizure orders may be appropriate. Regardless of whether the
copyright statute is amended, courts applying the statute should
rediscover the First Amendment.
A combination of existing intellectual property and contract
protections are sufficient to prevent gross piracy, especially when
reinforced by anticipated changes in pricing and new product
concepts and packaging. Copyright cooperatives can play a useful
role in reducing transaction costs for new types of protection
based on technological limitations on unauthorized uses, technological detection of copyright and license violations, and electronic payment systems. In addition, cooperatives can express and
enforce specific-use licenses and can address international issues
relating to choice of law and enforcement of judgments.
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